This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

06923864 4

THE

DIFFERENCE,

BETWEEN

WORDS, eſteemed SYNONYMOUS,

IN THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE;

And, the Proper CHOICE of them determined.

THE

DIFFERENCE,

BETWEEN

WORDS, esteemed SYNONYMOUS,

IN THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE;

And, the Proper CHOICE of them determined:

TOGETHER WITH,

So much of Abbé GIRARD's Treatise, on this Subject, as would agree, with our Mode of Expression.

By John Trusler

Useful, to all, who would, either, write or speak, with PROPRIETY, and, ELEGANCE.

In TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

Printed, for J. DODSLEY, in *Pall-mall.*

MDCCLXVI.

L 5

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
170436
ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS.
1900.

To the Right Honourable

PHILIP, Earl STANHOPE,

Viſcount MAHON, F. R. S.

SIR,

TO whom could a work of this kind, which is, a diſquiſition of what, others have ſpent a whole life, without the leaſt attention to, be inſcribed, with any ſeeming propriety, if not, to a gentleman, who has, himſelf, paſſed years, in the reſearches of literature; but, ſetting aſide its propriety, on this account; the obligations, you, and your lordſhip's family, have

been pleaſed to confer on me, and, mine, are ſufficient, to engroſs my continual reſpect, and, claim every acknowledgement in my power to make: accept, then, Sir, this public teſtimony of it; and, be aſſured, the dedicating this work to your lordſhip, proceeds more from an ambition of being thought one, of your many admirers, than, from any view of profiting, by your lordſhip's patronage.

Believe me, Sir, with the profoundeſt reſpect,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obliged, and, moſt obedient, humble ſervant,

LONDON,
May 21, 1766.

THE AUTHOR.

A

TRANSLATION,

OF

Abbé GIRARD's

PREFACE.

IF ſociety be formed, by the communication of ideas and ſentiments, ſpeech, is, undoubtedly, its moſt eſſential and moſt graceful band, being, at once, the pencil of the mind, the image of its operations, and, the interpreter of the heart. The more, we go

abroad, among men, the more, we perceive, that language, is the true ſeaſoning of every delight. When all things elſe fail, or, when, through age, we have no other enjoyment, that of converſation, will furniſh amuſement in our latter hours, and, will, at that time, grow more and more ſatisfactory; as it will, in ſome meaſure, make up for the want of thoſe pleaſures, we are incapable of receiving. In all times, and, on all occaſions, ſpeech is delightful: there can be no true happineſs, without the joys of the mind; no good fortune, that we do not long to make known; no ſecret, we do not wiſh to communicate; no tender ſentiment, we are not anxious to declare; no ſyſtem, we do not thirſt to unfold; no evil, we are not eager to complain of; no comfort, without the ſympathetic breathings of friendſhip; no reputation, without the voice of renov

in a word, nothing, without the aid of language, at leaſt, nothing, which can ſatisfy our underſtandings, or, flatter our inclinations. Who then would be ſo indolent, as, to pay no attention to the graces, or, ſo wanting, as, to diſregard the power of one faculty, which gives luſtre to every other? A polite nation, can never entertain notions, injurious to true taſte. Good education extends her care, equally, to the language of a people, as, their morals: ſhe does not confine herſelf, to the adorning of the mind, inwardly, with wiſdom, ſcience, and, virtue; but, labours, alſo, to grace it, outwardly, by teaching it the art of ſhewing itſelf to advantage. Her deſire is, that our expreſſions ſhould correſpond with our thoughts, and, that our reputation ſhould be anſwerable to our merit. Speech, then, deſerves our beſt attention, and we ought to think ourſelves

indebted to thoſe, who ſtudy its cultivation; whether by learned rules, drawn up according to its peculiar genius, to give a knowledge of it, with preciſion; or, by judicious criticiſms, in order, to preſerve its purity, without rejecting the new advantages, of which, it is ſuſceptible; or, by ſuch uſeful acquiſitions, as may enrich it, without rendering it unintelligible. But how much ſhould we be obliged to that perſon, who could in any meaſure fix it, and, put a ſtop to thoſe many innovations which mere caprice, daily, ſtrives to introduce? This is a taſk, I fear, beyond the power of individuals: the deſtiny of whatever is living, forbids its continuing, always, in the ſame ſtate. However, be the fate of our language, in after-ages, as it may; neither the fear of its alteration, nor, even, its annihilation, ſhall deter me from publiſhing the obſervations I have made.

made. They have neither the rules of grammar, nor the purity of cuſtom, for their object, but the delicate difference, only, between words, reputed ſynonymous; that is to ſay, the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics of ſuch words, as, reſembling each other, in their general idea, may, nevertheleſs, be diſtinguiſhable, one from another, by ſome additional one, peculiar to each of them; from whence ariſes, on many occaſions, a neceſſity of choice, in order to uſe them with propriety, and, elegance; a thing, as uncommon, as it is beautiful; and, by which taſte is enabled to give brilliancy to truth, and, ſolidity to wit. Avoiding all empty words, it teaches us to reaſon ſoundly; averſe to the abuſe of terms, it makes our diction intelligible; judicious in the choice of words, it gives eaſe and elegance to our expreſſions: with the greateſt accuracy, it baniſhes all far-

fetched, vague and ſpiritleſs images, with which the trifling and ſuperficial, are content to expreſs themſelves; an enemy to confuſion, it prevents our rambling in the ſtudy of the ſciences; in ſhort, I will venture to affirm, that this ſpirit of juſtneſs and diſtinction, is the true ray that ſhines; and, in converſation, is the lively touch, that diſtinguiſhes the man of delicacy and diſcernment, from the vulgar and illiterate.

In order to acquire this juſtneſs, we muſt be a little nice upon words, not imagining, that ſuch, as are called ſynonymous, are really ſo, exactly uniform in their ſenſe, and, reſemble each other, as perfectly, as two drops of water from the ſame ſpring: for, on a cloſer examination, we ſhall ſee, that this reſemblance, does not take in the whole extent and force of ſignification; but conſiſts, only, in one principal

cipal idea, which, they all expreſs; each word differing from the other, by ſome relative one, which conſtitutes its proper and particular character. That reſemblance, which conveys one general idea, makes, then, the words, ſynonymous; and, the difference, that ariſes from the particular idea, that accompanies the general, makes them, far from being perfectly alike, diſtinguiſhing them, as various ſhades of the ſame colour.

I will not, abſolutely, ſay, that there are not occaſions, on which, ſo nice a choice may be diſpenſed with; but, I maintain, that there are ſtill more, where they ought not, or, cannot paſs one for another, eſpecially, in ſtudied and elaborate compoſitions. I will allow it to be a matter of indifference, in chooſing a yellow habit, whether we take the hue of the marigold or jonquil; but, would we make an agree-

agreeable variety, it is neceſſary to conſult the different ſhades or tints: how ſeldom, then, does it happen, that the mind, does not find itſelf, in ſimilar circumſtances? Very rare indeed! as in that conſiſts, the whole art of writing.

Leſt any one, under a falſe notion, that the richneſs of a language conſiſts, in the plurality and abundance of words, ſhould explode this ſyſtem of mine, relative to the diſtinction of thoſe, reputed ſynonymous; I muſt ſay, that though language is enriched by an abundance of words, yet, that abundance is not merely numeral; which is fit for nothing, but, as it were, to fill the coffers of a miſer; but, ſuch as ſprings from diverſity, like that, which is obſerved, in the various productions of nature. It is the ſatisfaction of the mind, and, not the tickling of the ear, which is the object of all converſation

and

and writing; for which reaſon, the quantity of words, is not ſo much to be eſteemed, as their quality. If they vary, only, from each other in their ſounds, and, not in their greater or leſs degrees of energy, comprehenſion, preciſion, &c. they, in my opinion, ſerve more to burthen the memory, than, enrich or facilitate the art of ſpeech. To ſtand up for a number of words, without any regard to their ſenſe, is, confounding abundance, with ſuperfluity; ſuch a taſte, I cannot better compare, than, to that, of the maſter of a feaſt, who ſhould think the magnificence of an entertainment, conſiſted more, in the number of diſhes, than, of eatables. Where is the great utility in having many terms to expreſs one ſingle idea? Is there not more advantage in having proper expreſſions for every idea we can form?

It will be in vain for Pleonaſm, to alledge in its defence, that by this abundance, we avoid the bad effects of repetition; for, we are deceived with reſpect to the cauſe of that effect; it is not the repeating of the ſame ſound, that offends ſo much, as the repetition of the ſame idea. If the ſame word diſpleaſes, when uſed a ſecond time, it is not, becauſe it hath already ſtruck the ear; but, becauſe it hath, before, affected the mind, which grows weary, and, is diſguſted, without the graces of novelty. Hence, came the eſtabliſhment of certain words, we call Pronouns; the repetition of which, cuſtom hath made familiar, having given them no other office, than, ſimply, to recall the matter in queſtion, without any redundancy of words. For the ſame reaſon, what we call Articles, and, Prepoſitions, are, equally, repeated without diſguſt; nothing being expected

pected from them, but, a bare nomination or indication; for having nothing to determine of themſelves, they, always, appear new, when the ſubject they indicate, is new. This is an undeniable proof that the beauty of words, is more owing to their variety of meanings, than, to their different articulations; and, that 'tis a multiplicity of ideas, that produces, in effect, a multiplicity of terms. If any one, yet, doubts this, he has nothing to do, but to examine them a little cloſer, and, be a little nicer in his choice; or, without giving himſelf the trouble of ſuch examination, let him peruſe, only, with attention, the reflections here, laid before him; for, be the remarks, either juſt or not, they will, plainly, ſhew, that, there are no words, ſo perfectly, ſynonymous, as, to ſignify, exactly, the ſame, upon all occaſions; conſequently, they admit of a particular nicety

in

in choice. It is this choice, the following ſheets endeavour to determine, by definitions, and, examples, which diſtinguiſh, and, diſcloſe the proper character of theſe words; in which, it is hoped, they will, in ſome meaſure, ſucceed.

With reſpect to the work itſelf, it may be ſaid, without, either, vanity or affected modeſty, that, it is copied from no one; neither was there any one to copy; if it, therefore, merits nothing, from the manner of its execution; it will, at leaſt, from its novelty: to this may be added that of variety; for, almoſt, every page, contains ſomething differing from, and, independent of, that, which goes before, or, follows after, although of the ſame ſort. Never book was, at the ſame time, more uniform, and, more diverſified: its peruſal needs not be, either, continued or regular; let the reader open it, where he will,

will, he cannot fail of finding ſomething, and, that, entire; which will, at leaſt, ſatisfy his curioſity, if not content his underſtanding: it will ſerve as well, to amuſe a quarter of an hour, as, employ a whole day; and, may be taken up, and, laid aſide, at any time.

THE

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

AFTER giving the reader, a tranſlation of *Girard's* Preface, it will be unneceſſary, to ſay more, relative to the *uſefulneſs*, of the work, than, that, as a great *inattention* to the beauties of language, is general, almoſt, in *every* country; a volume or two, of *this* kind, muſt be, *equally*, acceptable *here*, as in *France*; and, it is hoped, the great eſteem, the *Abbé* acquired by *his*

his piece, and, the many editions, *that* has run through, are *ſufficient* proofs of its *excellence*, and, will be *ſome* excuſe, for *this* ſimilar attempt. As much of the *French* treatiſe, as would agree with the *Engliſh* mode of expreſſion, is tranſlated and adapted to it; and, if ſuch tranſlation, be found, in no reſpect, *uniform*; it muſt be attributed to *impoſſibility*. Should any one imagine, becauſe ſome words, which are here claſſed, as *paſſing* for *ſynonymous*, do not, *immediately*, ſtrike the mind, as *ſuch*; that, labouring at a *diſtinction*, was unneceſſary and uſeleſs; if he cannot recollect a paſſage, where he has *ſeen*, or, call to mind, that he has, at any time, *heard*, them *indiſcriminately* uſed; let him caſt his eye, over the *folio* edition, of *Johnſon's* dictionary, and he will, *inſtantly*, diſcover that theſe endeavours, though, *inadequate* to the taſk, have not been,

wholly,

wholly, fruitleſs; and, ſhould the ſame error be remarked, in the following pages, which the tenor of the work condemns, it is hoped, it will be attributed, to the neceſſity of varying the expreſſions, in a treatiſe of this *particular* caſt, in order to make them agreeable to the mind. There are, it muſt be confeſſed, *many* more words, that *might* have been taken under conſideration; but, on reflection, that a *thorough* reform, even in *theſe*, at *preſent*, taken notice of, will go, a *conſiderable* way, towards the *improvement* of our tongue; the work, cannot *but* be thought of ſervice. *One* motive that prevented the *extenſion* of theſe ſheets, was a *fear*, of *frighting* the reader, from attempting to *paſs through* them, by laying before him, the *difficulty* and *length* of the way: ſhould they chance to meet with approbation, they may, hereafter, pro-

bably, be *enlarged*; but, on the contrary, ſhould they, on *cloſe* examination, be found too *imperfect*, for public notice: let them, at leaſt, be conſidered, as the wanton *ſallies* of a mind, *greatly* zealous, for the *beauty* of its *native* language.

THE

ERRATA.

VOL. I.

Page 4, line 20. *for*, *decreaſe* in virtue, a *decreaſe* in piety, &c. *read*, *decreaſe* in virtue. A *decreaſe* in piety, &c. p. 24, l. 19. *for*, a bearing, witneſs &c. *r.* a bearing witneſs &c. p. 30, l. 8. *for*, a little of accuſation. *r.* a little of ſelf-accuſation. p. 34, l. 15. *for*, that is graceful &c. *r.* that is tall, graceful &c. p. 45, l. 3. *for*, the leaſt of &c. *r.* the laſt of &c. p. 50, l. 19, *for*, practiſe, *r.* practice. p. 53, l. 1. *for*, requires, *r.* require. p. 61, l. 12. *for*, the vengeance, and &c. *r.* the vengeance of God, and &c. p. 62, l. 20. *for*, are ſynonymous, &c. *r.* are eſteemed ſynonymous, &c. p. 65, l. 12. *for*, a weak man finds &c. *r.* weak men find &c. p. 121, l. 5. *for*, give, *r.* gives. —— l. 10. *for*, give, *r.* gives. p. 126, l. 16. *for*, render, *r.* renders. p. 129, l. 6. *for*, for, *r.* of. p. 136, l. 6. *for*, *finiſh-ing*, from the &c. *r.* *finiſhing*, that which riſe, from the &c. p. 178, l. 15. *for*, conſidered in itſelf, only in orde , &c. *r.* conſidered in itſelf, only, in order, &c.

THE

SIGNIFICATION

OF

WORDS, esteemed SYNONYMOUS,

IN THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE,

INVESTIGATED.

I.

To *Abandon*,	To *Relinquish*,
Forsake,	*Desert*,
Leave,	*Quit*.

THE words *abandon* and *leave* imply involuntary acts; the words *forsake*, *relinquish* and *desert*, those that are voluntary.

To *abandon*, is more applicable to things; *leave*, to persons. He was under a necessity of *abandoning* his possessions, and compelled to *leave* his friends.

To *forsake*, implies leaving in resentment or dislike; to *relinquish*, quitting

any claim to; to *deſert*, leaving meanly or treacherouſly.

Being treated with diſreſpect, we are apt to *forſake* even the perſon, whoſe cauſe we were ſtudious to eſpouſe. Every honeſt man, finding his plea not backed by juſtice, would readily *relinquiſh* his claim, and even make his competitor a recompence adequate to the expence and trouble he had put him to. It is an act of the greateſt baſeneſs to *deſert* one's friend in time of diſtreſs.

To *quit*, implies the breaking off from, and may be either voluntary or involuntary.

When he had acquired by trade ſufficient to ſupport himſelf, for the remainder of his life, he, prudently, *quitted* his buſineſs. Being overpowered, by ſuperior ſtrength, he was obliged to *quit* his hold.

We ſhould by no means *abandon*, while we can keep poſſeſſion; nor *leave*, while we are able to ſtay; we ſhould not *forſake*, without ſufficient reaſon; nor are we bound to *relinquiſh*, but when our title is bad; No colour of excuſe can be alledged for *deſertion*; nor ſhould we ever *quit*, with a view of laying hold again.

2.

2.

To *Abdicate*, *Renounce*, *Reſign*.

To *abdicate* is an involuntary act; *renounce* and *reſign* are voluntary.

Abdicate more particularly relates to a throne; *renounce*, to matters of religion; *reſign*, to employments.

King James the ſecond *abdicated* the throne of England, when he could keep poſſeſſion of it no longer. Many perſons, through conviction of mind, have formally *renounced* the errors of the church of Rome. We frequently *reſign* our employments, through a deſire of retirement.

To *abdicate* a crown, is ever looked upon as diſgraceful; to *renounce* a religion, as honourable, when done through the prevalence of truth; and to *reſign* an office, as noble, when generouſly given up in favour of another, and with the approbation of the perſon we ſerve.

3.

To *Abate*, *Diminiſh*,	To *Decreaſe*, *Leſſen*.

Theſe words are nearly ſynonymous, when they are verbs neuter; they, then, mean to grow leſs: as verbs active, they are very different. Even as neuters, they will carry ſome difference in their meaning.

To *abate*, implies a decreaſe in action; *diminiſh*, a waſte in ſubſtance; *decreaſe*, a decay in moral virtue; *leſſen*, a contraction of parts.

Want of ſpirits, when a man is running, will *abate* his ardour, and, conſequently, his pace. Febrifuges, if properly applied, will *abate* a fever. Put ſugar into water, and it will *diminiſh* viſibly. An object, ſeemingly, *diminiſhes*, in proportion to the diſtance, from which, we view it.

Through a contempt of religion, men, daily, *decreaſe* in virtue, a *decreaſe* in piety, is uſually accompanied with falſe notions of God. Draw the air from a blown-up bladder, and it *leſſens*, proportionably.

As verbs active; to *abate*, more particularly, implies, to lower in the price of; *diminiſh*,

diminiſh, to make leſs by abſciſion or deſtruction, either with reſpect to bulk, value, quality or quantity; *leſſen*, to a voluntary act of degradation.

Shop-keepers, generally, aſk their cuſtomers an advanced price for goods, that they may be enabled to *abate*, if deſired.

By dividing of ſubſtance, we *diminiſh* its bulk; by breaking a diamond, we *diminiſh* its value; by mixing water with ſpirits, we *diminiſh* the quality; and by taking one yard from ten, we *diminiſh* the quantity.

A mean action always *leſſens* us, in the ſight of good men; and whatever falſe notions vanity may inculcate, we ever ſeem *leſs*, when we ſtrive to appear greater.

4.

To *Abhor*, *Hate*,	To *Loath*, *Deteſt*.

All theſe words imply averſion, but require to be differently uſed, upon different occaſions.

To *abhor*, implys an averſion to that, to which, we have a natural antipathy; *hate*, an averſion actuated by revenge: *loath*, is

more applicable to food: *deteſt*, implies averſion actuated by diſapprobation.

We *abhor*, what we cannot endure. We are apt to *hate* the perſon, who injures us. We *loath* the food, by which we have been ſurfeited. We *deteſt* the man, who is guilty of a mean action.

The ſpendthrift, naturally, *abhors* niggardlineſs, and the niggard, profligacy. The *hatred* of the revengeful man, is rouſed, whenever the object of his revenge approaches. The ſtomach *loaths* the very ſight of that meat, by which we have been ſatiated. Every, thinking, man *deteſts* the leaſt degree of meanneſs, more particularly that, which is ſordid or baſe.

5.

Abject,	*Mean*,
Low,	*Beggarly*.

As the words *abject* and *low* are indiſcriminately uſed, when meant to ſignify a perſon's ſtate or condition; ſo are the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when we would expreſs the diſpoſition: but the impropriety of ſo doing, is very evident.

By *abject*, is underſtood that forlorn ſituation

ation in life, that a man brings himſelf into, by ill conduct; by *low*, that, in which Providence has placed him: the firſt, is voluntary; the latter, involuntary.

Divine Wiſdom hath thought proper, for various reaſons, to make diſtinctions between men, placing ſome, in a higher ſphere, others, in a *lower*; but never was he the cauſe of any one's *abjectneſs*. Want of merit or fortune, often, renders a man *low*; but it muſt be a villainous character, to make him *abject*.

With reſpect to the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when meant to expreſs the diſpoſition, the abſurdity of uſing them, one for the other, is, equally, viſible.

Mean, ſignifies a man's readineſs to perform a dirty or illicit action; whereas *beggarly*, is, more particularly, expreſſive of a narrow, groveling ſpirit.

He who can ſtoop, to be guilty of a *meanneſs*, merits the contempt of all who know him. It has, ever, been accounted *beggarly*, to live below the rank of life we are in.

When a man is brought into a ſtate of penury and contempt, by a long courſe of infamy, we, juſtly, call him *abject*; if his

narrow circumſtances are, only, owing to the poverty of his parents, we, then, repute him *low*; when guilty of any thing, beneath the character of an honeſt man, or a gentleman, we account him *mean*; and when the treaſures of the rich, are ſullied by the narrow notions of the poor, we call it *beggarly*.

6.

To *Aboliſh*, *Abrogate*, *Diſannul*,	To *Repeal*, *Revoke*.

Aboliſh, is a term, rather to be uſed with reſpect to cuſtoms; *abrogate* and *repeal*, with regard to laws; *diſannul* and *revoke*, to private contracts.

When old cuſtoms have been, by long experience, found to be detrimental, they have, very prudently, been *aboliſhed*. New faſhions, *aboliſh* old ones.

The word *abrogate*, is generally uſed with reſpect to ancient laws; *repeal*, to modern: that is, when we talk of rendering old laws null, we call it *abrogating*; when thoſe lately made, *repealing*.

Deſpotic power has frequently *abrogated* what was inſtituted by equity. Upon the enaction

enaction of a new law, many inconveniences have ſometimes appeared, before unthought of; this, has occaſioned a *repeal.*

The *abrogation* of a fundamental law, frequently cauſes the ruin of the ſovereign, or of the people; and, ſometimes, of both. The legiſlative power has often found itſelf obliged to *repeal* an act of parliament one ſeſſions, which paſſed the laſt; merely, to appeaſe the clamours of the people.

The difference in meaning, between the words *diſannul* and *revoke*, is not very great; yet ſuch, as to admit of a diſtinction.

Diſannul is applied to a written contract; *revoke* to a verbal.

He, who gives a conditional bond to another, has a right to *diſannul* it, if the ſpecified conditions are not punctually obſerved. To *revoke* a promiſe now-a-days, is no other, than faſhionable; whereas, formerly, it was conſidered, as a breach of friendſhip.

7.

To *Finiſh*, *Complete*,	To *End*, *Conclude*.

With reſpect to the three firſt words, the proper idea of *finiſhing*, is, the bringing a

thing to its laſt period: the *completion* of any thing, is, the actual arrival of that laſt period: and the characteriſtic of *ending*, is ceſſation or diſcontinuation.

Lazy people begin many things, without *finiſhing* any. We ever feel a ſecret ſatisfaction, in the *completion* of a work, we have been long about. May we not queſtion the wiſdom of thoſe laws, which, inſtead of *ending* ſuits, do but ſerve, to prolong them?

By the word *conclude*, we underſtand, performing the laſt act of ratiocination; widely differing from *complete*. We *complete* a piece of mechaniſm; but *conclude* an oration.

A piece of clockwork is of little value, till *completed*. It is allowed by all Rhetoricians, that the greateſt ornament of an harangue, is a well finiſhed *concluſion*.

We *finiſh* what we have begun, by continuing to work at it. We *complete* a work, by putting the laſt hand to it. We *end* it, by diſcontinuation. Thus, we may *finiſh*, without *ending*; and *end*, without *completing*.

8.

On,
Upon,

Theſe two words are indiſcriminately uſed, one for another, on all occaſions; but, with great impropriety.

On, rather, ſignifies by; as, *on* my word; *on* my honour; &c. whereas, *upon*, means up, on the top of; and is applied to matter; as, *upon* the table; *upon* the chair; *upon* the houſe; &c.

The abſurdity of a contrary diction, is evident from the following change of words: it was his honour, *upon* which, he ſwore.

Indeed, the word *upon* is uſed with elegance, even detached from ſubſtance, when the ſenſe is figurative; as for inſtance, he relied *upon* the promiſe of his friend; intimating, that, that promiſe, was the ſtaff, *upon* which, he leaned: but, on other occaſions, the impropriety is groſs.

9.

Action,
Act,
Deed.

As cuſtom has applied the word *deed*, chiefly to ſignify the written evidence of any legal act, it will be neceſſary, only, to ſhew the difference, between the words *action* and *act*.

The word *action*, then, is applicable, indifferently, to every thing we do, whether common or extraordinary; but the word *act*, ſhould ſignify, ſomething done, which is remarkable.

An elegant ſpeaker, will not ſay, a *virtuous act*, a *good or a vitious act*; but an *act of virtue*, or *of goodneſs*, or *of iniquity*: whereas, to ſay, a *virtuous action*, or *a good* or *vitious action*, is proper and elegant.

'Tis, generally ſpeaking, a good *action* to conceal the faults of our neighbours; and it is the rareſt *act* of charity, among mankind.

The ſentiments of the heart, are not, ſo much, to be judged of, from words, as from *actions*. It is an *act*, of great heroiſm,

to

to pardon our enemies, when we have power, to be revenged on them.

Theſe two words are further diſtinguiſhable by our conſidering them, ſomewhat phyſically. The word *action*, in this light, relates, more, to the power that acts; and the word *act*, is, more, applicable to the effect itſelf, produced by that power; this makes the one, properly, the attribute of the other: ſo, that it may be, juſtly, ſaid, we ſhould always have a preſence of mind, attendant upon our *actions*, to render, all of them, either *acts* of bounty, or *acts* of juſtice.

10.

To *Enlarge*, *Increaſe*.

The word *enlarge*, is, properly, uſed to ſignify an addition of extent. *Increaſe*, is critically, applicable, only, to number, height and quantity.

We *enlarge* a town; a field; a garden. We *increaſe* the inhabitants of a town; our expences; our revenues.

The former word, is, more, ſuitable to one entire and vaſt quantity of ſpace; the

latter

fitter, to any groſs and multiplied quantity in general: thus, it is, commonly, ſaid, that we have *enlarged* our houſe, when we have made it more extenſive, by adding buildings to the ſides of it: but, we, uſually, ſay, a houſe is *increaſed* with an additional ſtory, or with ſeveral new rooms.

By *enlarging* our territory, we, generally, *increaſe* our riches. Princes, certainly, *enlarge* their renown, by widening the bounds of their dominions; and they are apt to think, they, at the ſame time, *increaſe* their power: but, in this, they are, ſometimes, miſtaken; for ſuch an *enlargement*, may chance to produce, only, an, *increaſe* of cares and troubles, which may end, in their utter ruin.

A king, who labours, more, after acquiring new ſubjects, than, in governing thoſe he already has, may *enlarge* his fame; but will never *increaſe* his happineſs.

II.

Addreſs,	*Manners*,
Air,	*Deportment*,
Mien,	*Carriage*.
Behaviour,	

What is called our *air*, *mien* and *carriage*, ſeem to be born with us, and ſtrike at firſt ſight

ſight: our *addreſs*, *manners*, *behaviour* and *deportment*, are owing to education; and, gradually, diſcloſe themſelves, in our intercourſe with the world.

Mien, rather, relates to our look; *carriage* to our frame; but, the word *air* to both. We, uſually, judge of the *mien*, by the face; the *carriage*, by the perſon; and the *air*, by both.

How ſweet is the *mien*, that has good humour in the countenance! A gentleman, though in rags, is, eaſily, diſcovered, by his graceful *carriage*. An open countenance and majeſty of perſon, give a man, the moſt engaging *air* imaginable.

Addreſs, is confined to our words; *deportment*, to our actions; *behaviour* ariſes from both; and the fruit of *behaviour*, is *manners*.

Our *addreſs* ſhall often pleaſe, when our *deportment* ſhall diſguſt; and VICE VERSA.

When our *addreſs* is engaging, and our *deportment* comformable, 'tis impoſſible our *behaviour* ſhould be otherwiſe.

In order, to be well with the world, we ſhould ſuit our *behaviour*, to our company; which, though in the eye of ſome perſons, has

has been conſidered, as deceitful, muſt, in the end, be looked upon, as the height of good *manners*.

An engaging *air*, which is the union of a charming *mien* and graceful *carriage*, is neceſſary, to make any thing pleaſe; but unleſs accompanied with good *manners*, ariſing from a genteel *addreſs* and *deportment*, it becomes, perfectly, diſguſtful.

12.

To *Accoſt*, *Approach*.

We *accoſt* thoſe, with whom, we would ſpeak; but, often, *approach*, without any intention to *addreſs*.

The bold, can *accoſt*, without the leaſt heſitation. We cannot *approach* the great, without ſome kind of ceremony.

When we have any thing to ſay to a perſon, we, naturally, *accoſt* him: when we would inſinuate ourſelves into his good graces, we endeavour to *approach* him.

Education teaches us to *accoſt* the ladies with civility; but, to *approach* them, requires ſome kind of aſſurance, ſeaſoned with reſpect.

13.

Ingenuity,	*Abilities*,
Cleverneſs,	*Parts*,

Ingenuity, relates, more, to the invention of things; *cleverneſs*, to the manner of executing them; *ability*, to the actual execution of them; and *parts*, to the diſcernment. The third, then, puts in uſe, what the ſecond dictates, purſuant to the digeſted plan, of the fourth, invented by the firſt.

A man may be *ingenious*, and not *clever*; he may be *clever*, without *abilities* to execute; and he may have great *abilities*, and, yet, not be a man of *parts*.

Admitting we are not very *ingenious*, ſtill, if we are accuſtomed to the management of things, we may be *clever*; but it requires *abilities*, to do with them, as we would; and *parts*, to conduct them.

He, who diſcovered the powers of refraction and reflection, had he known nothing more, would have been *ingenious*: he, who conſtructed the teleſcope, was *clever*; the finiſher, was a man of *abilities*; and without doubt, the philoſopher, he, who applies the inſtrument to the various purpoſes of aſtronomy, muſt be a man of *parts*.

14.

14.

To *Add*, *Augment*.

By *adding* one thing to another, we *augment* the ſame. By the word *adding*, we underſtand, the joining of different things together; or, if they are things of the ſame kind, joining them, in ſuch a manner, as not to confound them, but, that after ſuch junction, each, may be diſtinguiſhed from the other: whereas, the word *augment*, indicates our making a thing larger or more abundant, by ſuch an addition, as ſhall cauſe it, afterwards, to appear one, and the ſame thing; or, at leaſt, that, when the addition is made, the whole, together, ſhall be conceived under one idea; thus, for example, we *add* one baſket of rubbiſh, to another, one room to another, but we *augment* the heap, and the houſe.

There are many, who would not ſcruple to *augment* their own ſtock, by fraudulently *adding to* it, that of another.

To *add*, is a verb active only; *augment*, both active and neuter.

Our ambition, *augments* with our fortune; and we are no ſooner in poſſeſſion of one

one hundred pounds, than we are eager to *add* to it another.

15.

To *Study*, *Learn*.

To *ſtudy*, implies a uniform application, in ſearch of knowledge; to *learn*, that application, with ſucceſs.

We *ſtudy*, to *learn*; and *learn*, by dint of *ſtudy*.

People of vivacity, *learn* eaſily; but are heavy at *ſtudy*.

We can *ſtudy* but one thing at a time; but we may *learn* many.

The more we *learn*, the more we know; but, oftentimes, the more we *ſtudy*, the leſs we know.

We have *ſtudied* well, when we have *learned* to doubt.

There are many things we *learn*, without *ſtudy*; and other things we *ſtudy*, without *learning*.

Thoſe are not the wiſeſt, who have *ſtudied* moſt; but, thoſe who have *learnt* moſt.

We

We ſee ſome perſons, *ſtudying* continually, without *learning* any thing; and others, *learning* almoſt every thing, without the leaſt *ſtudy*.

The time of our youth, is the time of *ſtudy*; but it is, in a more advanced age, when we, truly, can be ſaid, to *learn*; it is then, only, we have capacity to digeſt, what we have before, laid up in the memory.

16.

Buttreſs,
Support,
Prop.

The *Buttreſs*, fortifies; it is fixed cloſe, to reſiſt the impulſion of other bodies: the *ſupport*, bears, by being placed beneath a thing, to prevent its falling under a weight: the *prop*, aſſiſts, and its general uſe is, to ſtrengthen.

A wall is frequently made ſtronger, by *buttreſſes*: An arch is *ſupported*, by columns: A houſe, when in danger of falling, is kept up, by *props*.

That, which has received a violent thruſt, or is much bulged, ſtands in need of a *buttreſs*; that, which is too heavy to carry

carry itſelf, is in want of *ſupporters*; and that, which ought to ſtand upright, and cannot be made to do ſo of itſelf, muſt be *propped.*

In a figurative ſenſe, *buttreſs* relates, more, to defence; *ſupport*, to credit; and *prop*, to friendſhip.

The true Chriſtian, ſeeks no *buttreſs*, againſt the malignity of men, but that of innocence and integrity; he makes work, the moſt ſolid *ſupport* of his life; and looks upon implicit obedience to the decree of heaven, as the moſt ſteady *prop* of his felicity.

17.

Enough,
Sufficient.

The object of both theſe words, is quantity; but with this difference, that *enough* relates, more, to the quantity, one deſires to have, and *ſufficient*, to that quantity, one, really, wants to employ.

Thus, the avaritious man never has *enough*; let him accumulate ever ſo much, he, ſtill, deſires more; and the prodigal, never *ſufficient*; he, ſtill, wanting to expend more than he has.

We ſay, we have *enough*, when we wiſh not for more; and we ſay, we have *ſufficient*, when we have, juſt, what is neceſſary.

When applied to ſuch things, as are conſumable, the word *enough*, ſeems to denote, a much greater quantity, than the word *ſufficient*; for in relation to ſuch things, when we ſay we have *enough*, it ſeems, as though we ſhould have too much, had we more: but, what we call *ſufficient*, may be added to, without coming near that extreme: for, we may ſay, of a very ſmall income or revenue, that it is *ſufficient*; though, at the ſame time, we can hardly think it *enough*.

The word *enough*, has a more general and comprehenſive meaning; the word *ſufficient*, a more limited and particular one.

An hour at table, is, certainly, *ſufficient*, for our nouriſhment; but, not *enough*, for ſome perſons pleaſure or ſatisfaction.

An œconomiſt, can find *enough*, where there is very little; but the prodigal, never has *ſufficient*, let him have ever ſo much.

18.

To *Declare*,	To *Maintain*,
Affirm,	*Swear*,
Proteſt,	*Avouch*,
Aver,	*Atteſt*.
Aſſert,	

In the firſt ſeven words, we find different degrees of declaration. To *declare*, ſignifies, to tell any thing ſimply, but ſeriouſly; to *affirm*, means, to ſay confidently; to *proteſt*, implies a ſolemn affirmation; to *aver*, ſignifies, a poſitive declaration; to *aſſert*, that declaration, defended; to *maintain*, implies a ſupport of ſuch aſſertion; to *ſwear*, is, to ratify it, by an oath.

When we give our opinion, on being ſeriouſly aſked, we are ſaid, to *declare* it: when we would give that declaration, more force, we *affirm* it: and, to ſtrengthen that affirmation, we *proteſt* it, ſolemnly; that is we *affirm* it, by invoking the Deity.

The other words, are, ſufficiently, explained above.

If, ever, we wiſh, to gain credit, in the world, whatever we *declare*, ſhould be backed by truth. True politeneſs, forbids our

affirming any thing, unleſs required by the obligations of juſtice. To make frequent uſe of *proteſtations*, betrays a ſuſpicion, that our bare word, is not to be believed. Always to *aver*, hath an appearance of dogmatiſing; and ſhews us ignorant of that proper degree of diffidence, which ever accompanies wiſdom. Some perſons are ſo ready to *aſſert*, that let the matter be right or wrong, 'tis equally the ſame. When our opinions are juſt, and well-grounded, we have an undoubted right, to *maintain* them. *Swearing*, was firſt inſtituted in courts of judicature, as a conſcientious teſtimony of truth.

The words *avouch*, and *atteſt*, tho' often uſedas ſynonynous, with the foregoing; have a very different ſignification. The word, *avouch*, implies, an aſſertion, in defence of another; *atteſt*, a bearing, witneſs to what another has, juſt before, ſaid.

When the reputation of an honeſt man has been, undeſervedly, hurt, 'tis the part of a friend, to *avouch* his good character.

Too much care to *atteſt* all that is advanced, renders our converſation tireſome.

There is another verb, *warrant*, which has ſome affinity to the word *maintain*; but, as cuſtom has made the uſe of it vulgar,

it

it is unneceſſary to take any further notice of it.

19.

Arms,
Weapons.

By *arms*, we underſtand thoſe inſtruments of offence, generally, made uſe of in war; ſuch as, fire-arms, ſwords, &c. By *weapons*, we, more particularly, mean inſtruments of other kinds, (excluſive of fire arms,) made uſe of as offenſive, on eſpecial occaſions.

In the ſtate of Switzerland, all men are obliged to learn the uſe of *arms*, in their youth, that, in caſes of extremity, they may be capable of defending themſelves againſt the attacks of their enemies.

In times of inſurrection, people make uſe of ſuch *weapons* as they can get.

20.

Attractions,
Allurements,
Charms.

Beſides the general idea, which makes theſe three words appear ſynonymous, it is, likewiſe, their common fate, ſcarce ever to be uſed in the ſingular number; at leaſt, in thoſe ſenſes, in which, they are here conſidered; that is, whenever they are uſed to ſignify the power of beauty, of agreeableneſs, or, of any thing which pleaſes.

With reſpect to their different meanings, it appears to me, that *attractions* mean, ſomething natural; *allurements*, ſomewhat, rather, artificial; and *charms*, ſomewhat ſtronger and more uncommon than either.

Attractions, may be ſaid, to engage us; *allurements*, to entice us; *charms*, to ſeduce us.

The heart of man can ſcarce ſtand againſt the *attractions* of a pretty woman: It is with difficulty he can defend himſelf againſt the allurements of a *coquette*; but, to

to reſiſt the *charms* of a ſweet-tempered beauty, is impoſſible.

Ladies, always, owe their *attractions* and their *charms*, to a happy formation of their features and perſons; but they, ſometimes, procure their *allurements*, at their toilettes.

I know not whether I may fall in with the taſte of mankind; but in my opinion, *attractions* riſe from thoſe ordinary graces, which nature has beſtowed upon the women with more or leſs liberality, and which are the common appendages of the ſex; *allurements*, from thoſe cultivated graces, which form a faithful mirrour of the natural, and are ſtudied, merely, with a deſire to pleaſe; *charms*, from thoſe ſingular graces, which nature, ſometimes, beſtows as a moſt valuable gift, and which are more particular and perſonal.

Defects not ſeen at firſt, but afterwards obſerved, leſſen *attractions* greatly. *Allurements* vaniſh, as ſoon as the artifice appears. *Charms* loſe their force, when time and cuſtom hath rendered them familiar.

Theſe words are not in uſe only, with regard to beauty, and the graces of the ſex; but, with reſpect to every thing that pleaſes. In this caſe, *attractions* and *charms*,

are applied, only, to ſuch things, as are amiable in themſelves; whereas, the word *allurements*, is, ſometimes, applied to ſuch things, as are even in themſelves odious; but, which we love nevertheleſs.

Virtue has *attractions*, which the moſt vicious of men cannot avoid being ſenſible of. The riches of the world are *allurements*, which never fail to captivate, in ſpite of their ill tendency. Pleaſure has ſuch *charms*, that it is hunted after by every one, as well by the philoſopher, as the libertine.

We ſay, great *attractions*; powerful *allurements*; and, invincible *charms*.

Honour *attracts*; fortune *allures*; but, the *charms* of glory, are invincible.

21.

Miſerly,	*Covetous*,
Niggardly,	*Avaritious*.

The word *miſerly*, ſignifies, rather, a parcimonious diſpoſition, or a depriving ourſelves of the neceſſaries of life, merely to hoard the riches we poſſeſs. By *niggardly*, we

we underſtand, that ſordid temper, that does things by halves. *Covetous*, implies, an eager craving for the poſſeſſions of another. By *avaritious*, we mean, that inordinate thirſt of gain, that makes a man graſp at every thing he ſees. Taking the words in theſe ſenſes, which are undoubtedly the proper ones, we may be *covetous* and not *avaritious*, *niggardly* and not *miſerly*.

He, who never gives any thing away, is juſtly, called *miſerly*; he, who fails to beſtow when neceſſary, or, when he beſtows, gives too little, draws on himſelf the epithet of *niggardly*; he, who longs for the goods of another, is *covetous*; and he, who graſps at wealth by all means whatever, *avaritious*.

Of all extraordinary beings, there is no greater one than the *miſer*, who puniſhes himſelf, and ſtarves in the midſt of plenty.

The *miſer* is laughed at, but the *niggard* is deſpiſed.

The contented man is at quiet within himſelf; but the *covetous* is ever on the rack: he eagerly wiſhes for what another poſſeſſes, and his inability of obtaining it, is his continual torment.

It is neceſſary to be ever watchful of an *avaritious* man, for his diſpoſition leads him to take every opportunity of defrauding you.

22.

Acknowledgment, Confeſſion.

Acknowledgment, ſuppoſes a queſtion aſked; whereas, *confeſſion*, ſavours a little of accuſation.

We *acknowledge* what we had an inclination to conceal: We *confeſs* that which we were blameable in doing.

It is interrogation, which cauſes *acknowledgment*; repentance, *confeſſion*.

It is better to make a ſincere *acknowledgment*, than a bad excuſe.

We ſhould not *confeſs* to all ſorts of people.

An *acknowledgment* unaſked, is either noble or fooliſh, according to the circumſtances, and effect it produces.

Confeſſion, unaccompanied with repentance, is an inſult to the Deity.

It

It would be want of ſpirit, to *acknowledge* a fault, without a certainty that ſuch *acknowledgment* would be ſatisfactory; and it would be fooliſh, to make *confeſſion*, without hopes of pardon; for why ſhould we declare ourſelves culpable to thoſe, who breathe nothing but vengeance.

23.

Admonition,
Advice,
Counſel.

The end of *admonition*, is gentle reproof. *Advice* and *counſel*, are to convey inſtruction; but with this difference, that *advice*, implies no ſuperiority with reſpect either to rank or parts, in the perſon who gives it; whereas, *counſel*, generally, carries with it one, if not both.

Admonition, in a maſter, frequently has a greater effect than correction.

People are readier to give *advice*, than to take it.

Parents ſhould take care to *counſel* their children, before they turn them out into the world.

Admonition ſhould be given with temper. *Advice*, with ſincerity, and *counſel*, with art and modeſty.

Admoniſh a friend in private, but reward him openly.

Nothing is more ſalutary than good *advice*, and yet, nothing is more nauſeous to take.

When *counſel* is given with an air of impertinence, it is ſure to make the *counſel* deſpiſed, and the counſellor odious.

24.

To *Have*, *Poſſeſs*.

In order to *have* a thing, it is not neceſſary to have the power of diſpoſal of it, or to have it actually in our hands; it is ſufficient that it belongs to us: but to *poſſeſs* it, it muſt be in our hands, and, we have the liberty of diſpoſing of it, whenever we think proper.

Thus,

Thus, we *have*, an eſtate, notwithſtanding it is mortgaged for the benefit of our creditors; but, as to riches, we *poſſeſs*, them.

We are not always maſters, of what we *have*; we are, of what we *poſſeſs*.

A married man *has* continual torment, when the Demon of Jealouſy *poſſeſſes* him.

We *have* often but the half of things, partaking them with others; we *poſſeſs* them, when they are entirely our own.

Thoſe, who *have* only the knowledge of arts, follow their rules; but thoſe, who *poſſeſs* them, lay down their rules to follow.

25.

Battle,
Combat,
Fight.

Battle, is an action, more general, and commonly, preceded by ſome preparation. *Combat*, ſeems to be an action, more particular, and often unexpected. *Fight* may be either, one or the other, and is ſeldom uſed in the plural.

Thus, the *fight*, between the Carthaginians and the Romans, and that, at Pharſalia, between Cæſar and Pompey, were *battles:* but thoſe, in which the Horatii and the Curatii, decided the fate of Rome, were *combats.*

26.

Handſome,
Pretty,
Beautiful.

It is the fate of theſe words, when applied to the female ſex, to be uſed indiſcriminately one for the other, and yet, at the ſame time, no three words can be more different.

By a *handſome* woman, we underſtand one, that is graceful and well ſhaped, with a regular diſpoſition of features: by a *pretty*, we mean one, that is delicately made, and whoſe features are ſo formed, as to pleaſe: by a *beautiful*, a union of both.

A lady may be *handſome* and not *pretty*, *pretty* and not *handſome*; but, to be *beautiful*, ſhe muſt be both *pretty* and *handſome.*

Many a *handſome* woman has a forbidding countenance.

It

It has been the misfortune of many a *pretty* woman, to be crooked.

A *beautiful* woman, is, now-a-days, very rare to be met with.

Prettineſs, carries an idea of ſimplicity; *handſomeneſs*, of nobility; *beauty*, of majeſty.

The ladies, in romances, are deſcribed, as, either *beautiful* or *handſome*; the ſhepherdeſſes, by the poets, are repreſented as *pretty*; ſo, in other things, we ſay, a *beautiful* palace; a *handſome* houſe; a *pretty* cottage.

A *beautiful* woman, is an object of curioſity; a *handſome* woman, of admiration; and a *pretty* one, of love.

When applied to other things, *beautiful*, relates to ſomething more ſerious and engaging; *pretty*, to ſomewhat more gay and diverting: this is the reaſon why we ſay a *beautiful* tragedy; but, a *pretty* comedy.

27.

Benignity,	*Tenderneſs*,
Benevolence,	*Humanity*.
Kindneſs,	

Benignity, is a ſort of kind condeſcention, and an attribute of princes only. *Benevolence*, a wiſhing well to mankind, and ſeems relative to thoſe, who have, more particularly, the power of doing good. *Kindneſs*, is the ſame diſpoſition among equals. *Tenderneſs*, is a ſuſceptibility of impreſſion, and more applicable, to perſons nearly connected. *Humanity*, denotes a fellow feeling, for the diſtreſſes, even, of a ſtranger.

Benegnity, *benevolence*, and *kindneſs*, ſpring from the will; *tenderneſs*, and *humanity*, from the heart.

The *benignity* of a prince, makes him univerſally beloved by his ſubjects.

Benevolence, is a ſhining character, and is more conſpicuous, for the charitable actions it produces.

Kindneſs, is what one man naturally expects from another, and what we are reciprocally bound to impart.

The

The *tenderneſs* of a parent, has, often, been the ruin of a child.

The diſtreſſes of individuals, will, often, draw tears from a perſon, truly *humane*.

From the very inſtant of our birth, we experience the *benignity* of heaven, and malignity of corrupt nature.

The realized *benevolence*, of ſome good men, have, almoſt, made them worſhiped by their fellow creatures.

Kindneſſes, are in the power of every one to ſhew; therefore, he, that withholds them, favours more of the brute, than of the man.

The great *tenderneſs* of animals, to their young, is a ſtanding reproof to the many unfeeling mothers.

True *humanity* conſiſts, in not treating with rigour, but excuſing the weakneſſes, ſupplying the defects, aſſuaging the pains, and comforting the afflictions, of our neighbour.

28.

Poverty,	*Need,*
Indigence,	*Neceſſity.*
Want,	

Poverty, is that ſituation of fortune, oppoſed to riches, in which, we are deprived of the conveniences of life.

Indigence, is a degree lower; we there want the neceſſaries; and is oppoſed to ſuperfluity.

Want, ſeems rather to arrive by accident, implies, a ſcarcity of proviſions, rather than a lack of money, and is oppoſed to abundance.

Need and *neceſſity* relate leſs to the ſituation of life, than the other three words, but more to the relief we expect, or the remedy we ſeek; with this difference between the two, that *need*, ſeems leſs preſſing than *neceſſity*.

Merit, or a fortunate circumſtance, in life, frequently extricates us from a ſtate of *poverty*, in which we were born; and in which, prodigality often plunges the rich.

Diligence

Diligence is the beſt remedy againſt *indigence*, which is, generally, the juſt puniſhment of idleneſs.

Wiſe precautions prevent *want*, which is often brought on, by extravagance.

When we are in *need*, we ſhould ſeek aſſiſtance from our friends, but be careful not to importune too much.

The means of obtaining relief, in extreme *neceſſity*, is to implore the ſuccour of the truly charitable.

A ſtate of *poverty*, is moſt conducive to the health of the ſoul; we being there, out of the way of temptations.

The man, who opens his hand to the cravings of the *indigent*, feels within his breaſt a ſecret ſatisfaction, which the uncharitable man, is an entire ſtranger to.

He that will waſte, will *want*.

A friend in *need*, is a friend indeed.

Neceſſity, is the mother of invention.

29.

Good-fortune,
Proſperity.

What we call *good-fortune*, is the effect of chance; it comes unexpected. *Proſperity*, is the ſucceſs of conduct; and comes by degrees.

Fools have, ſometimes, *good fortune:* wiſe men do not, always, *proſper.*

The Capital, that was ſaved by the cackling of geeſe, and not by the vigilance of the centinels, is a piece of hiſtory, more proper, to ſhew the *good-fortune*, of the Romans, than their military government on that occaſion; though, on all others, their wiſe conduct, has contributed as much to their *proſperity*, as the valour of their ſoldiers.

30.

Good-nature,
Good-humour.

Theſe terms, though very expreſſive of their reſpective meanings, are too often for

for want of proper diſcernment, confounded.

We may be *good-humoured*, and not *good-natured*; *good-natured*, and yet not, always, *good-humoured*.

To make this properly appear, it is neceſſary to give a full definition of each.

By *good-nature*, is meant, that diſpoſition, which partakes the felicity of all mankind; that promotes the ſatisfaction of every individual, within the reach of its ability; that relieves the diſtreſſed, comforts the afflicted, diffuſes bleſſings, and communicates happineſs, as far as its ſphere of action can extend; whereas, *good-humour* is nothing more, than a chearful, pleaſing deportment, ariſing, either from a natural gaiety of mind, or, an affectation of popularity, joined to an affability of behaviour, which is the reſult of good-breeding, and a compliance with the taſte of every company.—This kind of *good-humour*, is by far, the moſt ſtriking quality; 'tis frequently miſtaken for, and complimented with, the ſuperior name of real *good-nature*. A man, by this ſpecious appearance, has often acquired that appellation, who, in all the actions of his private life, has been a moroſe, cruel,

cruel, revengeful, ſullen, haughty tyrant. On the contrary, a man of a true benevolent diſpoſition, and formed, to promote the happineſs of all around him, may ſometimes, perhaps, from an ill habit of body, an accidental vexation, or a commendable openneſs of heart, above the meanneſs of diſguiſe, be guilty of little ſallies of peeviſhneſs or *ill-humour*, that may carry the appearance of, and be, unjuſtly, thought to proceed from, *ill-nature*, by perſons who are not acquainted with his true character; and, who take them for ſynonymous terms, tho', in reality, they have not the leaſt analogy to each other.

31.

Happineſs,
Felicity,
Bliſs.

Theſe three words denote, equally, an advantageous ſtate, and agreeable ſituation; but that of *happineſs*, marks, properly, the ſtate of fortune, capable of diſpenſing pleaſures, and placing them within our reach; that of *felicity*, expreſſes, particularly, the ſtate of the

the heart; diſpoſed to taſte pleaſure, which it finds, in whatſoever it poſſeſſes; that of *bliſs*, which conveys a myſtic idea, paints a ſtate of imagination, which we anticipate, as it were, from a thorough conviction that we ſhall inherit it hereafter.

Our *happineſs* glares in the eyes of the world, and expoſes us, often, to envy. Our *felicity* is known only to ourſelves, and gives us continual ſatisfaction. The idea of *bliſs*, extends itſelf beyond a life temporal.

We are ſometimes in a ſtate of *happineſs*, without being in a ſtate of *felicity*. *Happineſs* conſiſts in the poſſeſſion of wealth, honours, friends and health; but 'tis the ſatisfaction of the mind, and the enjoyment of thoſe things, that conſtitutes *felicity*. As to *bliſs*, it is the portion of the godly, and depends in each religion, on the perſuaſion of the mind.

Satisfaction without, forms the *happineſs* of man; ſatisfaction within, his felicity: *bliſs* muſt be aſked of God. The firſt, is within the reach of riches, the ſecond, of wiſdom, but, the third, is reſerved for thoſe, whom the ſcripture calls, the poor in ſpirit.

32.

Confines,
Limits,
Bounds.

Confines, are where we are at liberty to go. *Limits*, are what we ought, not to paſs. *Bounds*, are what we can, not paſs.

We approach, or, get farther from the *confines*; we contract, or, extend the *limits*; we advance, or, remove the *bounds*.

By *confines*, we rather underſtand, the edge or border: the *confines* of a country, not ſurrounded by the ſea, are generally diſtinguiſhed by rivers or hills.

He, who continually exceeds the *limits*, which temperance hath ſet, will ſoon find himſelf, on the *confines* of the grave.

They ſay, with more eloquence than truth, that the *limits* of the Roman empire, were thoſe of the world.

The Sea, the Alps, and the Pirenean mountains, are the natural *bounds* of France.

Ambition knows no *bounds*; and we are never happy, but when the *bounds* of our fortune, are thoſe of our deſire.

33.

Extremity,
End.

Each, of theſe words, ſignifies, the leaſt of thoſe parts which conſtitutes a thing; but with this difference, that *extremity*, ſuppoſes a ſituation and an arrangement, intimating the greateſt diſtance; whereas, *end*, ſuppoſes a length only, and denotes, that place where the length ceaſes.

Extremity, anſwers to the centre; *end*, to the beginning; thus, we ſay, the *extremity* of a kingdom; the *end* of life.

34.

Aim,
View,
Deſign.

The *aim*, is more fixed, we take every method to purſue it; the *view*, more vague, we make uſe of means to accompliſh it; the *deſign*, more cloſe, we leave nothing undone to complete it.

A good prince has no other *deſign* in his government, than to render his ſtate flouriſhing

riſhing, becauſe, he has the happineſs of his people, in *view*, and true glory, is his *aim*.

The true Chriſtian has no other *aim*, than heaven; no other *view*, than to pleaſe God; nor any other *deſign* to complete, than his own ſalvation.

We are ſaid, to lay an *aim*; to have *views*; to form a *deſign*.

Reaſon forbids our laying any *aim*, that is impoſſible to attain; to *have* any chimerical *views*, or to form any *deſign* we are unable to execute.

If my *views* are juſt, I have a *deſign* in my head, that will bring me to my *aim*.

35.

Burden, *Load*.

By the word, *burden*, we underſtand, a weight, poſſible to be born; by *load*, a weight, more than we are able to bear.

A light *burthen*, is no inelegant expreſſion; but, a light *load*, certainly is.

In the heat of ſummer, our very cloaths, are a *burthen*.

Many a poor animal is ſo inhumanly laden, as to ſink under the *load*.

Taken now in a figurative ſenſe, they are, equally, different.

How unhappy is the man, who feels the *burthen* of an evil conſcience!

We have, ſometimes, thro' a bad habit of body, ſuch a *load* upon our ſpirits, as not to be able to ſupport ourſelves.

36.

Charm,
Enchantment,
Spell.

The word *charm*, carries an idea of force, which puts a ſtop to ordinary effects and natural cauſes. The word *enchantment*, is uſed, properly, for that which regards the illuſion of the ſenſes. The word *ſpell*, bears particularly an idea of ſomething, which diſturbs the reaſon. All the three, in the literal ſenſe, mark the effect of a magical operation, condemned by religion, and laughed at by philoſophy.

Antiquated tales, ſay there is a *charm* to deſtroy the effect of arms, and make them invul-

invulnerable. We read, in old romances, of the ſurpriſing power of *enchantments*, that have, ſuddenly, changed the manners, and reverſed the fortune. Weak people have thought, and do ſtill believe, that by means of a *ſpell*, the health has been deſtroyed, and the perſon ſo bewitched, made raving mad; but, perſons, of good ſenſe, ſee no *charm* in the world, but the caprice of paſſions, with reſpect to reaſon, which often ſuſpends reflexion, and ſtops the effects, which that would naturally and neceſſarily produce: they are acquainted with no other *enchantment*, than, that ſeduction ariſing from a depraved taſte, and diſordered imagination: they know alſo, that, which is fooliſhly attributed to the power of a *ſpell*, maliciouſly laid, is no other, than the effect of a bad conſtitution, which is frequently remedied, by an application of proper medicines.

37.

To *Chaſtiſe*, *Puniſh*,	To *Correct*, *Diſcipline*,

We *chaſtiſe*, him, who has committed a fault, to prevent his doing the ſame again: we *puniſh*, the perſon guilty of a crime, by way of expiation, and, as an example to others. To *correct*, ſignifies, to amend, by means of *chaſtiſement*; to *diſcipline*, means, to regulate and inſtruct.

We *chaſtiſe* a child, in order to *correct* his manners: officers are, frequently, obliged to *puniſh* a ſoldier with death, to keep up good *diſcipline* in the regiment.

It is neceſſary, for good *correction*, that the *chaſtiſement*, be not the effect of anger: juſtice demands, that the *puniſhment*, be rigorous, when the crime, is enormous; otherwiſe, there can be no good *diſcipline* in the ſtate.

God, like a tender father, *chaſtiſes* us in this life, that we may not be *puniſhed* in the life to come.

As the words *chaſtiſe*, and, *puniſh*, are thought to have the neareſt affinity to each

other; it may not be unneceſſary, to ſhew a, yet further, difference between them.

Chaſtiſe, then, carries, always, with it an idea of ſubordination; denoting, an authority or ſuperiority in him, who *chaſtiſes*, over the perſon, *chaſtiſed*; but the word, *puniſhment*, carries no ſuch idea, in its ſignification; for we are ſometimes *puniſhed*, by our equals, by ourſelves, by our inferiors, by the mere event of things, or, by the effects of the fault, we have committed.

Parents, who, thro' tenderneſs to their children, forbear to *chaſtiſe* them, are often *puniſhed* for their folly, by their future ingratitude and ill conduct.

38.

Prudence,	*Care*,
Diſcretion,	*Caution*,

Prudence, is here the mother virtue, and ſignifies, wiſdom applied to practiſe: *diſcretion*, is the effect of prudence, and means, a knowledge to govern or direct one's ſelf: By *care*, we underſtand, heed, in order to pre-

preſervation. *Caution*, implies, a greater degree of warineſs.

A proper attention to *prudence*, would make us ſo *diſcreet*, as to be *careful*, in every thing we do; and cauſe us to act, with the greateſt *caution*.

A haſty conduct, can never be called *prudent*: want of attention, in affairs of moment, is the greateſt height of *indiſcretion*; for without that neceſſary qualification, 'tis impoſſible any thing we do, can be attended with ſucceſs: He who expects to do any thing well, muſt act with *care*; and he, who is deſirous of avoiding difficulties, with *caution*.

To weigh matters well, before we put them into execution, is a mark of *prudence*.

A *diſcreet* man, in the company of dangerous perſons, ſuch as would take advantage of his words, would be *careful*, how he opened his mouth, and, would utter nothing, but with the greateſt *caution*.

39.

Circumſpection,
Conſideration,
Regard.

A proper attention, to the manner of acting, and, conducting ourſelves, in our commerce with the world, with reſpect to others; contributing rather to their ſatisfaction, than our own, is the common and general idea, which theſe three words preſent, at firſt ſight: notwithſtanding which, it appears to me, that their application ſhould be different.

Circumſpection, principally, takes place in diſcourſe; it prevents our letting any thing eſcape us, that may do hurt, or give offence; and, is the effect of prudence, which riſks nothing. *Conſideration*, is more perſonal, and relates, particularly, to our manner of treating other people, making a proper diſtinction, as different opportunities may offer; and, is the conſequence of eſteem and duty. *Regard*, relates more to the ſtate, or, ſituation of perſons; being, particularly, careful to omit nothing, which

good ſenſe and politeneſs requires; and, is the fruit of a good education.

To be well with the world, requires *circumſpection*, when we are ſpeaking before thoſe, with whom, we are not acquainted; *conſideration*, for people of rank and quality; and, *regard*, towards thoſe, with whom, we are intereſted.

We ought to have a great deal of *circumſpection*, in converſations of religion and government; becauſe, they are public matters, and, ſubjects, on which particulars are not, at liberty, to ſay, what they think, eſpecially, if their thoughts are in oppoſition to thoſe eſtabliſhed in the country, where they are. It is not adviſeable, for our intereſts, to omit ſhewing marks of *conſideration*, to ſuch perſons, whoſe aſſiſtance we may ſtand in need of, and, from whom, we hope to receive any ſervice. We cannot have too great a *regard* for the ladies; it is what they expect, and, are diſpleaſed if we neglect.

40.

Cunning,	*Artifice*,
Fineſſe,	*Trick*,
Device,	*Stratagem*.

Cunning, is the art of conducting deſigns, in a manner proper to ſucceed. *Fineſſe*, is a French word, lately adopted by the Engliſh, and means, an acting ſecretly and under cover. *Device*, is rather a pretty thought or contrivance. *Artifice*, is unnatural, and a far-fetched mean, of executing deſigns. *Trick*, which eludes the ſenſes, implies, a juggle: and *ſtratagem*, denotes, a diſguiſed way of obtaining our ends.

The firſt three of theſe words, are oftner underſtood in a good ſenſe, than the other.

Cunning, is employed in uſing means; *fineſſe*, inſinuates inſenſibly, and, muſt be accompanied by penetration; *device*, ſurpriſes, and, gives ſatisfaction; *artifice*, generally, makes uſe of ſtudied diſſimulation; a *trick*, is, commonly, looked on as a fraud, and a *ſtratagem*, is oftener illicit, than otherwiſe.

Without

Without ſome degree of *cunning*, it will be impoſſible to deal with, or, guard againſt, the generality of mankind.

Fineſſe, is ſo eſſential to the courtier, that, without it, he is ſeen through preſently.

Pretty *devices*, declare the authors of them, perſons of ingenuity.

We ought particularly to guard againſt a man, who makes uſe of a great deal of *artifice*.

Jugglers perform *tricks*, to divert, and conſequently, if clever, deſerve applauſe; but he, who *tricks* his neighbour, in order to ſerve himſelf, is a rogue.

All *ſtratagems*, in war, are lawful; but, in other caſes, they are ever conſidered, as derogatory to the character of an honeſt man.

41.

Moment,
Inſtant,

A *moment*, is not long; but, an *inſtant*, is ſtill ſhorter. The word *moment*, has a ſignification, more extended; it is taken ſometimes, for time, in general; and, is uſed in

a figurative ſenſe: that, of *inſtant*, is more contracted; it marks the ſhorteſt duration of time, and, is never uſed, but in the literal ſenſe.

All depends upon knowing the favourable *moment*; ſometimes, an *inſtant*, too ſoon, or, too late, is all, that makes the difference between ſucceſs and misfortune.

Let us baniſh thought, as much as in our power, ſtill, now and then, a reflective moment will intrude. The face of things, which we have thought eſtabliſhed, have been, frequently, changed in an *inſtant*.

Every *moment* is dear to one, who knows the value of time. Every *inſtant* of our life, is a ſtep nearer the grave.

42.

Cuſtoms,
Manners,
Faſhions.

Cuſtoms, relate to the general practice of the people; *manners*, to their way of life; and, *faſhions*, to their dreſs.

There cannot be a more ridiculous *cuſtom*, than that, of perſons complimenting

ing each other, in time of divine ſervice; it being ſuppoſed, they have there, more material things to engroſs their attention.

An increaſe, or, decreaſe of luxury, has been found to have, more or leſs, influence on the *manners* of the people.

It has been obſerved, that there is a continual round of *faſhions*; when the new are worn out, they, then, have recourſe to the old, and thoſe old ones, become new.

43.

To *Be*,
Exiſt,
Subſiſt.

Be, agrees with all ſorts of ſubjects, ſubſtances or modes; with all manner of beings, real or ideal: *Exiſt*, is uſed, only, with reſpect to ſubſtances, and thoſe, real: *Subſiſt*, is applied, equally, to ſubſtances or modes, but with reference to the duration of their being, which is not expreſſed by the other two words.

We ſay, of qualities, forms, actions, motions, and, of all their different relations, that, they *are*; we ſay, of matter, ſpirit,

bodies, and, all real beings, that, they *exiſt*: We ſay, of ſtates, works, affairs, laws, and, all eſtabliſhments, which are neither deſtroyed or changed, that, they *ſubſiſt*.

The verb, *be*, is commonly, uſed to mark the event of any modification or quality, in the ſubject: that, of *exiſt*, is in uſe, only, to expreſs the end of ſimple exiſtence: and we employ *ſubſiſt*, to point out the duration of that exiſtence or modification. Thus, we ſay, that man *is* inconſtant; that the phœnix *exiſts* not; that all human eſtabliſhments *ſubſiſt*, but for a time.

44.

Famous,	*Celebrated*,
Illuſtrious,	*Renowned*.

Each of theſe qualities, diſtinguiſhes the reputation; but that, which the word *famous*, expreſſes, means, no more than a ſimple diſtinction of one country or age, above another, let that diſtinction be taken either in good part or bad. That, which the word, *illuſtrious* expreſſes, is founded upon a merit, ſupported by dignity and glory; which makes the object, not only known,

known, but admired, and ranked among the great. That, which we underſtand, by the word, *celebrated*, expreſſes, a ſuperior degree of talents, with reſpect either to abilities or knowledge; tho' it raiſes not the object, to an equal degree of grandeur, with the *illuſtrious*, it is, nevertheleſs, honourable. That, which the word, *renowned*, denotes, is founded, only, upon faſhion or public taſte; which, without caſting much honour on the ſubject, draws it ſimply from oblivion, and makes its name known to the world.

The maid of Orleans, cried down by the Engliſh, but, eſteemed by the French, was, equally, *famous*, in both nations. Princes ſhine, during their life; but, they are only *illuſtrious*, in future ages, by the monuments of grandeur, wiſdom and greatneſs, which they leave behind them. There are *celebrated* authors, whoſe works, we cannot find fault with; and, thoſe, which we cannot even commend; without riſking our own reputation. A man's fortune is half made, when once he becomes *renowned* in his profeſſion.

Famous, *celebrated*, and, *renowned*, are equally, applicable to perſons or things;

but *illuſtrious*, to perſons only; at leaſt, when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Eroſtratus, among the Greeks, ſet fire to the temple of Diana, to make himſelf *famous:* he was rendered more ſo, by an order of the ſtate, that his name ſhould never after be mentioned, on pain of puniſhment. The greateſt part of our libels, are of the ſame kind; they raiſe a duſt and become *famous*, by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough became *illuſtrious*, by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are *celebrated* in hiſtory; ſo, are the many court-intrigues of the Dutcheſs. The Gobelins were ſo *renowned*, that their names live in the place, were they worked, and, in thoſe works, in which, others imitate them. It is a queſtion, whether the Phalernian wine was more *renowned*, than thoſe are, of Champaigne and Burgundy.

45.

Excuſe,
Pardon,
Forgiveneſs.

We make *excuſe*, for an apparent fault, or, ſlight offence: we aſk *pardon*, for a real fault, or, when the offence is greater. We implore *forgiveneſs* of our ſins. The firſt, is an apology, in order to juſtify ourſelves, and, is founded on politeneſs; the ſecond, is the mark of a good diſpoſition, and, is done, in hopes of extenuation; the laſt, to avert the vengeance, and, declares repentance.

The good mind, *excuſes*, eaſily. The good heart, *pardons*, readily. God delights more in *forgiveneſs*, than in *revenge*.

Excuſe, is more uſed, when we addreſs ourſelves to equals; *pardon*, to ſuperiors; and, *forgiveneſs*, to heaven.

Good manners demand an *excuſe* for that, which turns out wrong, let the intention be never ſo good. It can never be a degradation, to aſk pardon of that perſon, whom we have offended; beſides, the ſuperior rank of ſome perſons, makes it an abſolute duty in the offender. How great is the pre-

but *illuſtrious*, to perſons only; at leaſt, when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Eroſtratus, among the Greeks, ſet fire to the temple of Diana, to make himſelf *famous:* he was rendered more ſo, by an order of the ſtate, that his name ſhould never after be mentioned, on pain of puniſhment. The greateſt part of our libels, are of the ſame kind; they raiſe a duſt and become *famous*, by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough became *illuſtrious*, by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are *celebrated* in hiſtory; ſo, are the many court-intrigues of the Dutcheſs. The Gobelins were ſo *renowned*, that their names live in the place, were they worked, and, in thoſe works, in which, others imitate them. It is a queſtion, whether the Phalernian wine was more *renowned*, than thoſe are, of Champaigne and Burgundy.

but *live*, relates to the particular place where, we inhabit; *dwell*, to the building, in which, we reſide.

We *live*, in London; in Middleſex; in the country; we *dwell*, in a large houſe; a cottage; or, a furniſhed lodging.

When perſons of diſtinction, *live* in London; they *dwell* in hovels, comparatively ſpeaking, with their houſes in the country.

We ſay, with great propriety, I *live*, all the ſummer, in the country; and, have one of the prettieſt *dwellings* imaginable.

48.

To *Stay*, *Remain*.

The common idea of theſe two words, is a ceſſation of progreſſion; and their difference conſiſts in this; that, to *ſtay*, ſeems to have leſs duration, than to *remain*.

A good ſervant, when ſent on a meſſage, *ſtays*, as ſhort a time as poſſible.

When we have given offence, we ſhould endeavour to make ſuch an attonement, that the offended party may not *remain* diſſatisfied.

preſumption of that wretch, who fancies himſelf not in need of the *forgiveneſs* of the Almighty!

46.

Duty,
Obligation.

Duty, means, ſomething conſcientious, and, ſprings from a law; *obligation*, ſomething abſolute in practice, and, ſprings from cuſtom.

We are ſaid, to fail, in our *duty*; and, to diſpenſe, with an *obligation*.

It is the *duty* of a clergyman, to carry himſelf modeſtly; and he is *obliged*, to wear dark coloured cloaths.

Policy finds leſs diſadvantage, in neglecting her *duty*, than in forgetting the leaſt of her *obligations*.

47.

To *Live*,
Dwell.

Theſe two words are ſynonymous, in that ſenſe, in which they ſignify reſidence; but

The leaſt noiſe *awakes* thoſe, who ſleep indifferently. It requires but little, to *awaken* a paſſion, which is not, entirely, rooted out from the heart.

50.

Heavy,
Weighty.

The word *heavy*, is more applicable to that, which loads the body; *weighty*, to that, which burdens the mind. It requires ſtrength, to carry the one; parts, to ſupport the other.

A weak man finds that, *heavy*, which, the ſtrong find, light. The adminiſtration of ſtate affairs, is too *weighty* a concern, for one perſon to undertake.

51.

To *Conquer*,
Subdue,
Overcome.

Each of theſe words, implies, reſiſtance; but, that of *conquer*, refers to victory over enemies;

The duration of time, expreſſed by the word, *ſtay*, ſeems leſs determinate, than that, by the word, *remain*.

Thus, we ſay, he *remained* at his country houſe a month; he *ſtay'd* longer, than we expected.

49.

Event,
Incident.

Event, is a word, moſt agreeable to ſtates and governments; *incident*, to caſualties in private life.

The revolutions of the ſtate, are *events*, that determine the happineſs of the people.

Our life is full of *incidents*, which, the eye of prudence cannot foreſee.

50.

To *Awake*,
Awaken.

The firſt, of theſe words, is, more frequently, uſed in a literal ſenſe; the laſt, in a figurative.

The

53.

To no purpoſe,
Ineffectually,
In vain.

We work, *to no purpoſe*, when we meet not with the reward, we expected to receive; *Ineffectually*, when that, which we have done, anſwers not the end propoſed; *In vain*, when our work, is of no kind of uſe whatever.

I ſhall have worked *to no purpoſe*, if theſe ſheets meet not with the approbation of the public; *Ineffectually*, if, after all my trouble, I have not been able to ſhew the true difference between words, reputed ſynonymous; and, *in vain*, if the book is found to be, neither amuſing or inſtructive.

54.

Wave,
Surge,
Billow.

Waves, are the natural effect of the fluidity of a running water; they are as applicable to rivers, as the ſea; and, leave the

mies; and is, generally, uſed in the literal ſenſe: that of *ſubdue*, is more applicable to our paſſions; being, oftener, uſed in a figurative; and means, a bringing under ſubjection: that of *overcome*, ſuppoſes efforts, againſt any obſtacle that oppoſes; meaning, rather, to ſurmount.

We have *conquered* our enemies, when we have beat them, in ſuch a manner, as to put it out of their power, to do us any further hurt. We may be ſaid, to have *ſubdued* our luſts, when we are able to withſtand every temptation. We *overcome* our adverſaries, when we obtain our end, in ſpite of every oppoſition.

It requires courage and valour, to *conquer*; endeavour and reſolution, to *ſubdue*; patience and perſeverance, to *overcome*.

Alexander gloried more in his *conqueſts*, than in any other thing upon earth. Of all paſſions, avarice is the moſt difficult to *ſubdue*; as neither age, or, weakneſs of conſtitution, is able to rebate its edge. We ſhould ſtrive to *overcome* evil, with good.

55.

Uproar,
Tumult,
Riot.

Uproar, conveys an idea of ſome great noiſe; *tumult*, and, *riot*, of ſome great diſorder.

The diference between the words *tumult*, and, *riot*, is, that *tumult*, implies, the riſing of many people; *riot*, the diſturbance of a few; whereas, an *uproar*, may be occaſioned, by one ſingle perſon.

Tumults, and, *riots* are, always, attended with ſuch *uproars*, as give umbrage to a peaceable neighbourhood.

Houſes of debauchery, are ſubject to *riots:* a *tumult* often happens, in ill-policed cities.

56.

Inclination,
Propenſion,
Bias.

Theſe three words riſe gradually; *inclination*, implying ſome thing leſs ſtrong, than

than *propenſion*; *propenſion*, than *bias*: the firſt, leads us to an object; the ſecond, draws us, the third, drags us.

Inclination, is, greatly, owing to education; *propenſion*, to cuſtom; *bias*, to conſtitution.

Choice of company, is eſſential to the education of youth, becauſe, at that age, they imbibe eaſily the *inclinations* of thoſe, whoſe company they keep. It is a dangerous thing, to give a looſe to any one vice, as frequent commiſſion, is apt to create ſtrong *propenſion*. Perſons of warm conſtitutions, have a natural *bias* to venery.

Inclination, is, generally, applied to good objects; *propenſion*, to bad. Thus, we ſay, the charitable man is ever *inclined* to aſſiſt his neighbour. So depraved is human nature, that we have, always, a *propenſion* to vice.

Of two perſons to be ſerved, a foreigner, and, a countryman; we are, generally, *biaſſed* in favour of the laſt.

57.

Should,
Ought,
Is neceſſary.

The firſt of theſe expreſſions, implys, more preciſely, an obligation of complaiſance, cuſtom, or, perſonal intereſt: thus, we *ſhould* not offend the company, we are in; we *ſhould* follow the faſhion; we *ſhould* know a man, before we truſt him. The ſecond, denotes, more particularly, an obligation of reaſon and good ſenſe; thus, we *ought* in every thing, to give up to thoſe, who know better than ourſelves; we *ought* to ſerve them, who have ſerved us. The third, is more uſed to expreſs an eſſential and indiſpenſable obligation; thus, it *is neceſſary*, to love God, in order to be ſaved: It *is neceſſary*, to be complaiſant, to pleaſe.

than *propenſion*; *propenſion*, than *bias*: the firſt, leads us to an object; the ſecond, draws us, the third, drags us.

Inclination, is, greatly, owing to education; *propenſion*, to cuſtom; *bias*, to conſtitution.

Choice of company, is eſſential to the education of youth, becauſe, at that age, they imbibe eaſily the *inclinations* of thoſe, whoſe company they keep. It is a dangerous thing, to give a looſe to any one vice, as frequent commiſſion, is apt to create ſtrong *propenſion*. Perſons of warm conſtitutions, have a natural *bias* to venery.

Inclination, is, generally, applied to good objects; *propenſion*, to bad. Thus, we ſay, the charitable man is ever *inclined* to aſſiſt his neighbour. So depraved is human nature, that we have, always, a *propenſion* to vice.

Of two perſons to be ſerved, a foreigner, and, a countryman; we are, generally, *biaſſed* in favour of the laſt.

points it out to us: *beſides*, all nature makes us perceive it.

59.

To *Manifeſt*, *Publiſh*, *Proclaim*.

Theſe three words, imply, open declaration; but that of *manifeſt*, ſeems to convey, a proof of what is made known; meaning, to ſhew inconteſtably: *Publiſh*, denotes, only, a ſimple declaration, but general: to *proclaim*, is, to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has loſt his name, let him *manifeſt* his good character, as much as poſſible, he will find it difficult, to recover the good opinion of mankind, for prejudice is blind, even, to the moſt viſible truths. He who *publiſhes* to the world, the failings of another, betrays in himſelf, a want of humanity, and, is ſure to meet with the contempt of every thinking man. A famous Sultan of Egypt left to poſterity, a moſt remarkable teſtimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur; for, on his

58.

Furthermore,
Moreover,
Beſides.

Furthermore, is, properly, uſed, when there is need only to add one more reaſon, to thoſe, before-mentioned; its intent, is to multiply, and, it has no relation, but to number. *Moreover*, is in its right place, when uſed, to add a reaſon of a different kind, to thoſe, that went before; its chief office is, to add, with a particular reſpect, to diverſity. *Beſides*, is uſed with propriety, when we would ſtrengthen by a new reaſon, the force of thoſe, that were ſufficient of themſelves, its principal office is, to enhance by abundance.

For a ſtate to ſupport itſelf, thoſe, who govern, ſhould be moderate; thoſe who ought to obey, governable; *furthermore*, the laws ſhould be judicious. There will always be war among men, becauſe, they are naturally ambitious, and are governed by intereſt; *moreover*, zeal for religion, makes them rigid. Holy Scripture teaches us the unity of the Godhead, and, reaſon points

points it out to us: *beſides*, all nature makes us perceive it.

59.

To *Manifeſt*, *Publiſh*, *Proclaim*.

Theſe three words, imply, open declaration; but that of *manifeſt*, ſeems to convey, a proof of what is made known; meaning, to ſhew inconteſtably: *Publiſh*, denotes, only, a ſimple declaration, but general: to *proclaim*, is, to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has loſt his name, let him *manifeſt* his good character, as much as poſſible, he will find it difficult, to recover the good opinion of mankind, for prejudice is blind, even, to the moſt viſible truths. He who *publiſhes* to the world, the failings of another, betrays in himſelf, a want of humanity, and, is ſure to meet with the contempt of every thinking man. A famous Sultan of Egypt left to poſterity, a moſt remarkable teſtimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur; for, on his

death-bed, he commanded, that his winding ſheet ſhould be carried at the end of a lance, by a herald; who was to *proclaim*, here is all, that this great prince will carry out of the world with him, of his wealth, dignity, and dominion, that he enjoyed upon earth.

Manifeſtos of a ſtate, are, uſually, *publiſhed*, by formal *proclamation*.

60.

To *Tell*,	To *Divulge*,
Diſcloſe,	*Diſcover*,
Reveal,	

To make known that which is unknown, is the common ſignification of thoſe words: but, to *tell*, is to declare things purpoſely, with a deſign to inform thoſe, we would not have remain ignorant. To *diſcloſe*, is to ſhew, either by deſign or inadvertency, that which was before concealed. To *reveal*, is to lay open a ſecret: to *divulge*, is to do the ſame abroad. To *diſcover*, is the declaring a perſon to have done a thing, which he would not have been thought the author of.

So

So great an itch, have ſome perſons for prattling, that they *tell* every individual thing they hear. Confidents too often *diſcloſe* the intrigues, they are entruſted with. Confeſſors *reveal*, ſometimes, by their imprudence, the confeſſion of penitents. The *divulging* of a ſecret, has, often, done more harm, than any other one thing whatever; as it is impoſſible to ſmother, what once has been blazed abroad. If we would not be *diſcovered*, we ſhould be careful to have no witneſs of our actions.

61.

Equivocation,
Ambiguity,
Double-entendre.

Equivocation, has two ſenſes; the one, natural, in which, we would have what we ſay underſtood, and, in which, the hearer does, abſolutely, underſtand us; the other, perverted, underſtood only, by the perſon ſpeaking. *Ambiguity*, has one general ſenſe, ſuſceptible of different interpretations; it, always, creates a difficulty in getting at the true ſenſe of the author, and, ſome-

times, an impoſſibility. The *double-entendre*, a french word lately naturalized, has two natural and apt ſignifications, one of which preſents itſelf to the common underſtanding of all the world; and, by the other is made, a fine alluſion, underſtood, but by certain perſons.

Theſe three ways of ſpeaking, are, upon occaſion, ingenious methods of concealing one's true meaning: but we make uſe of an *equivocation*, to deceive; of an *ambiguity*, to keep in the dark, from all; and of a *double-entendre*, to conceal, from ſome.

It is beneath the character of an honeſt man, to make frequent uſe of *equivocations*; he that does, being ſure to meet with the contempt of mankind. *Ambiguities*, are perhaps, oftener the effect of a confuſion of ideas, than a ſtudied deſign of keeping people in the dark: we ought never to uſe them, but when an elucidation would be dangerous. Malice and politeneſs have introduced the *double-entendre*, but it ſhould never, be uſed, at the expence of our neighbours reputation.

62.

62.

Great,
Big,
Large.

The word *great*, is a general term, ſignifying any thing conſiderable either in bulk, extent, quality, number, &c. thus we ſay, a *great* houſe; a *great* road; a *great* weight; a *great* many; a *great* famine; a *great* happineſs. The words *big*, and, *large*, are more circumſcribed; *big*, implies, greatneſs of bulk; *large*, greatneſs of extent. Thus, we ſay, a *big* man; a *big* ſtone; but, a *large* room; a *large* field.

A *large* man, is as great an impropriety, as a *big* field; and we need, only, mention a *big* or *large* pleaſure, to ſhew the abſurdity.

63.

Grave,
Serious,
Staid.

We are *ſtaid*, through diſcretion and cuſtom; *grave*, thro' humour and conſtitution; *ſerious*, thro' taſte and affectation.

Levity is the reverſe, of being *ſtaid*; vivacity, of *gravity*; wantonneſs, of *ſerioufneſs*.

A conſtant round of buſineſs and continual tranſaction of affairs, make us *ſtaid*; reflections on our latter end, give *gravity*; the deſire of being thought *grave*, *ſerioufneſs*.

64.

Genius,
Talent.

Theſe are both born with us, and are a happy diſpoſition of nature, by which, we are qualified for ſome peculiar employment: but *genius*, ſeems to be more internal, and poſſeſſed of the powers of invention; *talent*, more external, and capable of execution.

Thus,

Thus, we have a *genius*, for poetry and painting; but, a *talent*, for ſpeaking and writing.

Such as have a *genius* for mechanics, may have no *talent* for watch-making.

65.

People,
Perſons.

The word *people*, is ſo very general, that it cannot be connected with a determinate number; as, for inſtance, four, five, or, ſix *people*; but that of *perſons*, may:

To be pleaſant at table, none ſhould be admitted but *people* of good humour; neither, ſhould there be more, than ſeven or eight *perſons*.

In order to deſcribe a company, we ſhould know the quality of the *people*, and the number of *perſons*, preſent.

In all governments, we find ill-affected *people*: and there are, always, among a number, ſome diſcontented *perſons*.

66.

To *Regard*, *Concern*, *Touch*.

We ſay, very indifferently, without much choice, that a thing *regards* us, *concerns* us, or, *touches* us, to mark the part we bear in it. There, nevertheleſs, appears to me, to be a delicate diſtinction between theſe three expreſſions, each riſing, gradually, above the other, according to the rank, in which, I have placed them. Tho' we have the leaſt part, imaginable, in a thing, it may be ſaid, to *regard* us; to *concern* us, we muſt have a greater; but, when we are ſenſibly affected by it, it may be ſaid, to *touch* us. It ſeems alſo, that the word *regard*, is more applicable, when our intereſt is in queſtion; that of *concern*, when ſpeaking of things, committed to our care and conduct; that of *touch*, when it reſpects our honour or fortune.

The ill-behaviour of a ſervant, to a cuſtomer, *regards* the maſter; as it affects his intereſt. The leaſt diſturbance in Europe, in ſome meaſure, *regards* every ſtate;

it

it being difficult, for any of them, to keep a perfect neutrality, for any length of time, while the others are at war. All the operations of government, *concern* the firſt miniſter. It *concerns* a man, to be punctual, in the diſcharge of his duty: The conduct of a wife, *touches* the huſband, ſo cloſe, that he ought to have an eye over all ſhe does. The behaviour of an ambaſſador, *touches*, always, more or leſs, the honour of the prince he repreſents.

Many people make themſelves uneaſy at that, which does not, in the leaſt, *regard* them; meddle with what no ways *concerns* them; and, at the ſame time, are indifferent to thoſe things, which *touch* them nearly.

67.

Tranquillity,
Peace,
Quiet.

Theſe words, let them be applied either to the ſoul, to a republic, or any particular ſociety; expreſs, equally, a ſituation exempt from trouble and moleſtation;

but *tranquillity*, relates to that, within oneſelf, and in the time preſent, independent of any other relation: *peace*, to the ſituation, with regard to enemies, in whoſe power it is, to make an alteration: *quiet*, with reſpect to time paſt or future, as ſucceeding or preceding a ſituation troubled.

Uneaſy people have no *tranquillity* in their families. Litigious perſons are hardly ever at *peace* with their neighbours. After a troubleſome time, we enjoy a *quiet* ſtate, with greater ſatisfaction.

What a ſtate of *tranquillity*, does the religious man enjoy; no outward things having the power to ruffle or diſcompoſe him! To preſerve *peace*, we ſhould keep ourſelves, always, in a ſtate of defence. It is indulgence, only, that will eſtabliſh *quiet* in a mutinous people.

68.

Temple,
Church.

Both theſe words ſignify, an edifice, ſet apart for the public ſervice of religion;

but that of *temple*, is a more pompous expreſſion, and leſs in uſe, than *church*: with reſpect to the Pagan religion, we, frequently uſe the word *temple*: as the *temple* of Apollo; the *temple* of Janus; but with relation to our own, ſeldom: St. Paul's *church*; St. Saviour's *church*.

Temple, ſeems to expreſs ſomething, more auguſt, and ſignifies, properly, an edifice, dedicated to the deity. *Church* ſomething, more common, ſignifying, particularly, an edifice, erected for the congregation of the faithful.

The grandeur of Solomon's *temple*, was beyond deſcription. Nothing profane ought to enter the *temple* of the Lord. The preſent thinneſs of our *churches*, is a manifeſt ſign of a decreaſe in religion. Nothing ought to be permitted in *church*, that does not contribute to the edification of chriſtians.

69.

Huge,	*Enormous,*
Vaſt,	*Immenſe.*

The common idea of theſe words, is ſomething, greatly, beyond the uſual meaſure; but thoſe, of *huge*, and, *vaſt*, relate, more, to ſuch things, as are material; thoſe, of *enormous*, and, *immenſe*, to ſuch, as are ideal; with this difference, between them; that *huge*, implies, greatneſs in bulk; *vaſt*, greatneſs in extent; *enormous*, greatneſs in ſize, even to deformity and dreadfulneſs; *immenſe*, unlimited extent, even beyond expreſſion. Thus, we ſay, a *huge* giant; a *vaſt* tract of land; an *enormous* crime; the *immenſe* expanſe.

There are ſome promontories, ſo *huge*, as to ſhock the eye that views them. The deſarts of Arabia, are ſo *vaſt*, that unleſs travellers carried their lodging and proviſion with them, they would periſh, before they reached their journey's end. The ſins of the preſumptuous wretch, are ſo *enormous*, that he can have little hopes of ſalvation, but, in the infinite mercies of an all-gracious God. So great is the *immenſity*

ſity of the Godhead, as to exceed the utmoſt ſtretch of human thought.

70.

Way,
Road.

Way, is much more extenſive and general, than *road*; and implies the paſſage from place to place, whether through the high *road*, or not: *road*, is much more limited, and particular, and means the beaten way of travellers, from one town or city to another. Which, ſays the traveller, is our beſt *way* to Hampton; the Hounſlow *road*, or Kingſton? either *road*, ſays his guide, is good; but when we come to Twittenham, the ſhorteſt *way*, is acroſs the fields; tho' the pleaſanteſt *way*, would be, to go by water.

As the word, *way*, is, often, uſed to ſignify, means; which, when conſidered as the intermediate ſtep to attainment, is not, widely, different from that, of *road*; when we would adopt the figure of travelling, not to confuſe our ideas, we, generally, make uſe of the word *road:* thus, diligence

gence with perſeverance, is the high *road* to preferment; yet, notwithſtanding, *way* is a much more elegant expreſſion: a ſtrict adherence to the principles of chriſtianity, is the direct *way* to heaven.

71.

Ways,
Means.

We go, the *ways*; we uſe, the *means*.

Ways, are the methods, we take, *means*, what, we put in execution, to ſucceed. The firſt word, enfolds in its idea, honour and probity; the laſt, pays little or no regard, but, to the end aimed at. Thus, good *ways*, are thoſe, which are juſt; good *means*, thoſe, which are ſure.

Simoniacal practices, are very bad *ways*; but, very good *means*, of obtaining benefices.

I cannot avoid here, taking notice of the ingrammatical impropriety, of annexing the ſingular number, to the word *means*; the fault, almoſt, of every ſpeaker and writer; liberality, ſay they, is, *a* ſure *means*, of becoming popular: there *is*, no better

means,

means, of keeping in with the world, than that, of paſſing by affronts, with compoſure:—Glaring abſurdity! ſince, the word, *means*, is evidently, plural, and it would be, much more, elegant, was the falſe concord avoided.

72.

Often,
Frequently.

One, relates to the repetition of the ſame acts; the other, to a plurality of objects. We, *often*, diſguiſe our thoughts: by doing the ſame thing, *often*, it becomes habitual. We, *frequently*, meet with traitors; we, *frequently*, do thoſe things, which we repent of, afterwards.

There are two other words, bearing an equal ſignification with *often*, *viz.* *oft*, and, *oftentimes*, but they being, no more, than the ſame word, abbreviated and lengthened; it is needleſs, to take any further notice of them.

73.

Cannot,
Impoſſible.

One of theſe words, more properly, relates to inability; the other, to impoſſibility.

We *cannot* ſerve two maſters. It is *impoſſible* to execute two oppoſite orders, at the ſame time.

We *cannot* love one, by whom we have been injured. It is *impoſſible*, to love one, to whom, we have a natural averſion.

74.

Glory,
Honour.

Glory, expreſſes ſomething, more ſingular, than *honour*. The one, makes us undertake, voluntarily, the moſt difficult things; the other, leads us, willingly, to the execution of the moſt rigorous exactions.

Queſt of *glory*, ſometimes, ſtimulates the ſoldier's courage, even to raſhneſs; and notions

tions of *honour*, in ſpite of fear, keep him, often, to his duty.

An indifference to *glory*, may paſs unnoticed; but not ſo, with reſpect to *honour*.

It is cuſtomary, in converſation, to place intereſt, in oppoſition to *glory*; and inclination, to *honour*: thus, we ſay, an author, who labours after *glory*, takes more pains in the completion of his piece; than he, who works, merely for intereſt: and, when an avaritious man lays out his money, it is more through *honour*, than inclination.

75.

World, *Univerſe*.

World, conveys only an idea, of one ſingle being, though general; that which exiſts: *Univerſe*, an idea, of many beings, or, rather that, of all parts of the world; all that exiſts: the firſt, of theſe words, is, ſometimes, uſed in the literal ſenſe, as when, we ſay, the old and new *world*; and ſometimes in a figurative, as, when we ſay, in this *world*, and in the other; the wicked *world*; the polite *world*: the ſecond, is, always, uſed according to the

the letter; and in a ſenſe that excepts no one thing: it is, for this reaſon, when we would expreſs the *univerſe*, by the term, *world*, that, we are obliged to put the word, *all*, before it, which, we have no occaſion to do, by *univerſe*; for example, we ſhould ſay, the ſun warms *all* the *world*, and, is the heat of the *univerſe*.

76.

Anſwer, *Reply*.

The *anſwer*, is made to a demand or a queſtion, aſked; the *reply*, to an anſwer or a remonſtrance.

Academics are taught firſt, to ſtart difficulties, and then, to *anſwer* them. It is nobler, to hear a wiſe remonſtrance, and, profit by it; than make any *reply*.

The word, *anſwer*, is more extenſive in its ſignification, than *reply*; we *anſwer* the queſtions of thoſe, who aſk us; the demands, of ſuch, as expect our ſervices; the examination of counſel; the arguments of diſputants; the letters we receive; and, for

for all our conduct. The word, *reply*, is far more limited; it ſuppoſes a diſpute, commenced from difference of ſentiment; we *reply*, to the anſwer, of an author whoſe works we have criticiſed; to the reprimands of thoſe, whoſe correction, we are unwilling to ſubmit to; to pleaders; to an anſwer in chancery.

An *anſwer*, ſhould be clear, true, and dictated by reaſon, and good ſenſe; a *reply*, ſtrong and convincing, armed by truth, and ſtrengthened by experience.

We ſhould teach children, as much as poſſible, to give nice and judicious *anſwers*; and convince them, that there is more honour, in liſtning, than in making *replies* to thoſe, who have the goodneſs to inſtruct them.

77.

Danger,	*Riſk*,
Hazard,	*Venture*,

All theſe words, imply, chance of harm; but that, of *danger*, relates to the evil, that may happen; thoſe, of *hazard*, *risk*, and, *venture*, to the good, we may loſe; with this

this difference, that, *hazard*, expreſſes ſomething, near; *riſk*, ſomething, at a diſtance; *venture*, ſomething, farther off, relating only to the poſſibility of events. Hence thoſe expreſſions, in *danger*, of death; in *hazard*, of our life; by giving a looſe to debauchery, we *risk* our health; nothing *venture*, nothing have.

Danger, creates fear; *hazard*, alarm; *risk*, caution; but we, often *venture*, with the greateſt ſatisfaction.

The avaritious man, ſpurred on by intereſt, fears no *danger*; *hazards* his health and happineſs; runs every *risk* that attends his profeſſion; and, gladly, ventures his all, in ſearch of that, which, if obtained, he would not have the ſpirit, to enjoy.

78.

Againſt,
In ſpite of.

Both theſe, denote oppoſition; but, the expreſſion, *in ſpite of*, implies, more reſolution and greater force, than the word, *againſt*; *againſt*, ſuppoſing little, or no reſiſtance,

ſiſtance, in the object oppoſed; but, *in ſpite of*, a conſiderable ſtruggle.

We act *againſt* the will, or, *againſt* rule, and, *in ſpite of* oppoſitions.

The good man, does nothing, *againſt* the dictates of his conſcience. The wicked man, commits ſin, *in ſpite of* the puniſhment, annexed to it.

Raſhneſs, will attempt things, *againſt* all appearance of ſucceſs; and reſolution, will purſue the attempt, *in ſpite of* all the obſtacles it meets with.

79.

Boldneſs,	*Impudence,*
Audaciouſneſs,	*Effrontery,*

There is a commendable *boldneſs*, that proceeds from a ſelf-conſciouſneſs of worth; but the *boldneſs*, which is here meant, ſprings from ignorance; is brazen and preſuming. *Audaciouſneſs*, is a greater degree of *boldneſs*; ſuch, as is ſteeled againſt reproof; is rude and noiſy. *Impudence* conſiſts, in being an utter ſtranger, to all kind of modeſty; is ſcurrilous and abuſive. *Effrontery*, proceeds from pride, and

ſelf-

ſelf-ſufficiency; is overbearing and inſolent.

The *bold*, are unawed by diffidence; they ſpeak, with great aſſurance; neither the quality or rank of thoſe, they addreſs, being able to diſconcert them. The more you reprove the *audacious* man, the more it hardens him; he, wilfully, forgets the reſpect, due to his ſuperiors, and, idly, imagines his boiſterous behaviour, a diſtinguiſhing mark of manhood. The weapons of the *impudent*, are ſaucineſs and abuſe; which, they take up at every turn; and, with which, they lay about them, in a moſt unmerciful manner. As great a cauſe of *effrontery*, as any, is the want of education; he, whom it poſſeſſes, is arrogant and inſolent, a ſtranger to good-ſenſe, and unacquainted with the rules of good-breeding.

80.

Profitable,
Advantageous,
Beneficial.

Profitable, is more applicable to gain; *Advantageous*, to honour, or any kind of convenience; *beneficial*, to health.

Some kinds of merchandiſe, are far more *profitable*, than others. A good name is very *advantageous*, as, it ſerves to puſh us forward in the world. Loſs of blood, to a feveriſh perſon, is very *beneficial.*

Light *profits*, make a heavy purſe. A ſeaſonable word, ſpoke in favour, is, frequently, of more *advantage*, than the greateſt ſervices. The greateſt *benefit* to the ſoul, is, a ſincere repentance.

81.

To *See*, *Look at*,	To *Behold*, *View*.

We *ſee*, whatever ſtrikes the ſight: we *look at* an object, when we deſignedly caſt our eye upon it: we *behold* it, when we look with attention: we *view* it, when we ſurvey it.

We *ſee*, all objects before our eyes: we *look at*, thoſe, which excite our curioſity: we *behold*, ſuch, as cauſe our admiration: we *view*, thoſe, we are deſirous to examine.

We *ſee*, diſtinctly or confuſedly. We *look at*, near, or at a diſtance. We *behold*, with wonder and attention. We *view*, with care and exactneſs.

The eyes, open, to *ſee*; turn, to *look at*; fix themſelves, to *behold*; and move all ways, to *view*.

The connoiſſeur, in painting, *looks at* the firſt picture, he *ſees*; if it be the work of a celebrated artiſt, he *beholds* it, with pleaſure, and *views* every part of it, with the greateſt minuteneſs.

82.

To *Stare*, *Gaze.*

Though the common meaning of theſe words is, to fix both the eyes upon an object, and look at it with wonder, intently and earneſtly; yet, there is a great difference between them: *ſtaring*, implies, looking, with wonder and impudence; *gazing*, with wonder and reſpect.

The impudence of ſome fellows, is ſo great, that, they will *ſtare*, a modeſt woman, out of countenance.

A man in love, will, ſometimes, *gaze* upon the object of his affections, till he, almoſt, loſes his ſight.

When our Saviour firſt appeared to his diſciples, after his reſurrection; they *gazed* on him, with aſtoniſhment and rapture.

To *ſtare* another, in the face, has, always, been conſidered, as a breach of good manners.

83.

Useful,
Serviceable.

As nearly synonymous, as these words may appear to be, there is, yet, a manifest difference between them, but the distinction is so delicate, as to require some attention to discover it. *Useful*, in my opinion, is more applicable to things, in use; to those we have often recourse to; and what, cannot be well done without: *Serviceable*, to things, of service, such, as we, oftener, do without, than with: and such, as we little expect to have. Thus, furniture is *useful*; memorandum books, to persons engaged in a multiplicity of Business, are *useful*. Friends and good connections, are *serviceable*.

The plummet, is so *useful* to the carpenter; that, to fix a perpendicular, without it, would give him a great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horse, is the most *serviceable*.

To those, who take snuff, a box, is extremely *useful*; but its contents, very far, from *serviceable*.

84.

84.

Gulph,
Abyſs.

What theſe words ſhould expreſs, is rather imaginary, than real: they are, generally, uſed therefore in a figurative ſenſe: we are ſuppoſed to be ſwallowed up, by a *gulph*; and loſt, in an *abyſs*. The firſt, carries with it, an idea of inſatiable voracity, which drags in and conſumes all, that approaches; the ſecond, of an unmeaſurable depth, to whoſe bottom, we can never get; and in which, we loſe, at the ſame time, the ſight of the place, from whence, we came, and of that, where, we are going.

A *gulph*, is ſuppoſed to have, many turns and windings; of which, when we have once ſet a ſtep in, we cannot poſſibly get out, but are carried on, in ſpite of all our endeavours to the contrary. An *abyſs*, is ſuppoſed to have, many uncertain and obſcure roads, without end; in which, tho' we may, ſometimes, ſtoop, in hopes of finding a way out; yet, being deceived, we become diſheartened, bewildered with doubts, and overwhelmed with deſpair.

170136

A looſe woman, is a *gulph* of woe, all periſhes there; virtue, riches, and health. Philoſophy, teaches us, that man is, continually, wandering, in an *abyſs* of darkneſs.

85.

Determination,
Reſolution.

Determination, is an act of judgment, and ſuppoſes examination; *reſolution*, an act of the will, and ſuppoſes deliberation: the firſt ſhuts out ſuſpence; the laſt, wavering.

Our *determinations*, ſhould be juſt, to avoid repentance; our *reſolutions*, fixed, to exclude variation.

Nothing is more diſagreeable, both to ourſelves and others; than to be, always, *undetermined*, in our affairs, and *irreſolute*, in our proceedings.

It is more difficult, to *determine* on points of precedence; than, on ſolid and real intereſts.

tereſts. There are, no weaker *reſolutions* than thoſe, made at confeſſion, or, on a ſick-bed; the firſt return of health, carrying us again, into the ſame courſe of life.

We may be *determined*, and yet not *reſolved*; that is, we may come to ſome deciſion, and ſtill, not be ſo far *reſolved*, as to put that deciſion, into execution; fear, timidity, or, ſome other motive, may prevent us.

The *determinations* of women, are ſeldom better grounded, than on whimſey or caprice: Men, are, ſo often, led by taſte and cuſtom: that, their *reſolutions* are, generally, vain.

In ſcience, we ſay, the *determination* of a point; the *reſolution* of a difficulty.

The more, we *determine*, the leſs, we prove. Though, in the ſchools, we anſwer every difficulty, we *reſolve* but few.

86.

Old,
Ancient,
Antique.

Theſe words riſe one upon the other; *antique*, upon *ancient*, and that, of *ancient*, upon *old*.

A faſhion is *old*, when it ceaſes to be in uſe; *ancient*, when its uſe, has been, ſometime, paſt; *antique*, when it has been, a long time, *ancient*.

That, which is recent, is not *old*; that, which is new, is not *ancient*; that, which is modern, is not *antique*.

Oldneſs agrees beſt with age; *ancientneſs*, with the origin of families; *antiquity*, with what exiſted in former times.

As we grow *old*, we decreaſe in ſtrength; but gain more experience.

Ancientneſs, makes faſhions diſagreeable; but adds ſplendour to nobility.

Antiquity, deſtroys the proofs of hiſtory, and weakens credit; but renders monuments of greater value.

87.

87.

General,
Univerſal.

General, implies, a great number of particulars; *univerſal*, every particular.

The government of princes, has no object in view, but, the *general* good. The providence of God, is *univerſal.*

An orator ſpeaks, in *general*, when he makes no particular application. Knowledge is *univerſal*, when it knows every thing.

Chriſtianity is, *generally*, known and believed; but, not *univerſally.*

88.

Word,
Term,
Expreſſion,

Nothing is more common, than an indiſcriminate uſe of theſe words; and yet none differ more among themſelves. A *word*, is a ſingle part of ſpeech; is general, and determined by uſe: *Term*, is a

particular caſt of language; owes its formation to the ſubject, and its excellence, to its ſuitableneſs. *Expreſſion*, is a certain mode of ſpeech; riſes from thought, and is, more or leſs, beautiful, according to its particular turn.

The purity of language, depends upon its *words*; the preciſion, upon its *terms*; and brilliancy, upon its *expreſſions*.

Elaborate diſcourſes, require the *words*, to be, truly, Engliſh; the *terms*, proper; and the *expreſſions* noble.

A *word*, which has eſcaped us, undeſignedly, ſometimes, has been attended with fatal conſequences. *Terms* of art, are now, pretty generally, known; however, they appear with little grace, except, in the mouths of the profeſſors of thoſe arts. Starched or far-fetched *expreſſions*, carry with them, an air of pedantry.

89.

Pile,
Heap,

Theſe words, equally, ſignify a quantity of things together, one upon another; with

with this difference, that *pile*, rather means, things put up, regularly; whereas, *heap*, implies no other order in the arrangement, than what riſes from chance. As, a *pile* of wood; a *heap* of rubbiſh.

We ſay, a *pile* of bricks; when they are, the materials, prepared for building; and a *heap* of bricks, when they are, the remains of a fallen edifice.

90.

Departure,
Death,
Deceaſe.

Departure, is a ſtile, more refined, and carries with it, an idea of the paſſage, from one life, to another; *death*, more common, and ſignifies, preciſely, extinction of life; *deceaſe*, more ſtudied, is a term ſomewhat bordering upon the law, and implies, the refuge of mortality. The ſecond, of theſe words, is made uſe of, with reſpect to all ſorts of animals; the other two, to man only.

A glorious *departure*, is preferable to a ſhameful life. *Death*, is the common lot

of all things living. Succeſſion, does not take place, 'till the moment of *deceaſe*.

Departure preſents nothing horrid to the imagination, it indicates ſomething agreeable, in eternity: *deceaſe*, conveys, only, an idea of trouble, in being ſeparated from things, we are much attached to: but *death*, preſents ſomething dreadful and affrighting.

91.

Value,
Worth.

Value, riſes from the intrinſic goodneſs of things; *worth* from the eſtimation, of them.

Of two things, the beſt, is the moſt *valuable*; and that *worth* moſt, that bears the greateſt price.

92.

Valley,	*Vale*,
Bottom,	*Dale*.

Of theſe four words, *valley*, implies, a narrow ſpace, ſituated between two hills; *bottom*, a like ſpace, but, quaggy and diſagreeable,

greeable. *Vale*, ſignifies, a ſpace, more extended: whereas, *dale*, means, rather, low lands.

The words, *dale* and *vale*, are, oftener, found in poetry; *valley* and *bottom*, in proſe.

Valleys are, for the moſt part, winding, and, as they receive water from the hills on each ſide, are, generally, converted into meads. He, whoſe houſe ſtands in a *bottom*, cannot live on a more unhealthy ſpot. A fine *vale*, with beautiful encloſures, bounded by riſing woods, is a delightful proſpect. *Dales*, are much eaſier to be ploughed, than hilly lands.

93.

Head,
Chief.

The word *head*, is reckoned ſynonymous only, to *chief*, when uſed in a figurative ſenſe; but, even then, it requires a different application. *Head*, agrees beſt, with reſpect to arrangement: *chief*, with regard to ſubordination. Thus, we ſay, the *head*

of a batallion, or, a ſhip; the *chief* of a party, or, an undertaking.

A commander in *chief*, is generally, at the *head* of his troops.

94.

Impediment,
Obſtacle,
Obſtruction.

There ſeems to be a gradation in theſe words. The *impediment*, ſtays; the *obſtacle* reſiſts; the *obſtruction*, puts an entire ſtop to.

We ſay, remove the *impediment*; ſurmount the *obſtacle*; take away or vanquiſh the *obſtruction*.

Even ſmall *impediments*, ſometimes, prove ſuch *obſtacles*, as *obſtruct* our beſt endeavours.

The word, *impediment*, ſeems to expreſs ſomething, riſing from the nature and proper circumſtances of what we are about; that, of *obſtacle*, ſomething, from a foreign cauſe; that of *obſtruction*, ſomething, proceeding from a ſuperior force.

Every temptation, may be ſaid, to *impede*

pede our reſolutions to virtue. The eloquence of Demoſthenes, was the greateſt *obſtacle*, that Philip of Macedon found, in all his political undertakings, and which he could never ſurmount, but by force of arms. Nearneſs of kin, is an *obſtruction* to marriage, which the laws have made, and which, thoſe laws, only, can take away.

95.

Learning,
Literature,
Erudition.

Of all order of words, there does not appear a more regular climax than in the above three; which ſeems to be compleated, by the word, KNOWLEDGE; but as that, has never been accounted ſynonymous with theſe, I ſhall take no notice of it, here.

Learning, implies, ſimply, that knowledge, which we acquire, by our common ſtudy at ſchool. *Literature*, denotes, polite learning, or, an acquaintance with the BELLES LETTRES, and is rather, practical; but

but *erudition*, ſignifies, great depth of knowledge, with a particular relation to that, which is ſpeculative.

Without ſome degree of *learning*, 'tis impoſſible to paſs well, through the world. There was a time, when the nobility piqued themſelves, on being men of *literature*. A taſte for *erudition*, will furniſh infinite amuſement, for a tranquil and retired life.

96.

To *Inquire*, *Interrogate*, *Aſk*.

We *inquire*, we *interrogate*, we *aſk*, in order to know; but the verb, *inquire*, implies, curioſity; that, of *interrogate*, authority; that of *aſk*, ſomething, more, civil and reſpectful.

The words *inquire*, and *interrogate*, make ſenſe, by themſelves; but, to uſe the word *aſk*, with propriety, we muſt add the matter to it; that is, to make the ſenſe perfect, we muſt mention the thing we *aſk*.

'Tis,

'Tis the buſineſs of a ſpy, to make *enquiries*. Criminals are *interrogated* by the judge. The ſoldier *aſks* orders from the commanding officer.

97.

To *Shun*,
Avoid,
Fly.

We *ſhun*, thoſe perſons, whom we would not ſee, or by whom, we would not be ſeen. We *avoid*, doing things, that are diſagreeable to us. We *fly*, both perſons and things, which we fear and dread.

In the words, *ſhun* and *avoid*, which ſeem to have the neareſt affinity to each other; there is this ſtanding difference, that, the word, *ſhun*, is generally, applied to perſons; that, of *avoid*, to things.

In order to *fly*, we turn to the oppoſite ſide, and get quick away, to prevent being taken; in order to *ſhun*, we take another road, getting ſlily away, to *avoid* being ſeen, or to eſcape a trap; in order to *avoid*, we uſe ſome extraordinary means.

We

We *ſhun* troubleſome company. We *avoid* running into exceſs. We *fly* thoſe, who purſue us.

Knowlege of the world, makes us *ſhun*. Prudence makes us *avoid*. Fear, makes us *fly*.

The beſt remedy againſt the plague, is to *fly* far from the place where it is. The ſureſt method of preſerving our innocence, is to *ſhun* bad company. It is an act of the greateſt weakneſs, not to *avoid* doing thoſe things, which are detrimental to our intereſt.

98.

Severity,
Rigour.

Severity, ſhews itſelf, chiefly, in the manner of thinking and judging; it condemns readily and admits of no excuſe. *Rigour*, is ſeen, particularly, in the manner of puniſhing; it pardons nothing, nor lightens the ſtroke.

Falſe-devotees are *ſevere*, only to others, whom, they are ever eager to condemn; and are always, applauding their own actions. *Rigour*, can never be juſtifiable, but,

but, at thoſe times, when example is of the utmoſt conſequence; yet, even then, ſome ſort of allowance ſhould be made for human frailty.

99.

To *Succour*, *Help*, | To *Aſſiſt*, *Relieve*.

We make uſe of the word, *ſuccour*, in danger; *help*, in labour; *aſſiſt*, in want; *relieve*, in diſtreſs. The firſt, ſprings from a motive of generoſity; the ſecond, from good nature; the third, from humanity; the fourth, from compaſſion.

We give *ſuccour*, in battle; we *help*, when we carry part of another's burden; we *aſſiſt*, the poor; and *relieve*, the afflicted.

The policy of ſtates has found it neceſſary to *ſuccour* each other, when the power of any one of them, is gaining too great a head. Very extraordinary things have been done, by the joint *help* of numbers. Many a parent, has beggar'd himſelf, in advancing the fortune of his child, tis therefore, the indiſpenſable duty of that child, to *aſſiſt* his father, to the utmoſt

of

of his power. The truly compaſſionate man, receives, as much inward ſatisfaction in *relieving* the diſtreſſed, as he communicates.

100.

Always,
Continually,
Perpetually.

That which we do, *always*, we do, at all times, and on all occaſions; that, which is done, *continually*, is done, without interruption, or intermiſſion, but, for a time limited; whereas, what is done, *perpetually*, is done, alſo, without intermiſſion, and, without any regard to time.

We ſhould, *always*, prefer our duty to our pleaſure. It is impoſſible to be, *continually*, at work. The heavenly bodies are, *perpetually*, in motion.

To pleaſe in company, we ſhould, *always*, talk well, but not, *continually*. The longitude may be diſcovered by *perpetual* motion.

101.

Diverſity,
Variety.

Diverſity, ſuppoſes a change, which taſte is always in ſearch of; in order to diſcover ſome novelty that may enliven and delight it: *variety*, ſuppoſes a plurality of things, differing from each other in likeneſs, which cheers the imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a uniformity.

Without ſome *diverſity*, life would be, altogether, inſipid. Nature has thrown infinite *variety* among the ſmalleſt objects; which, if we cannot perceive, is owing to a defect of light.

An agreeable *diverſity* of colours, will give as much pleaſure to the eye, as harmonious ſounds to the ear. *Variety* of amuſements, inſenſibly, lead us into a diſſipation.

102.

Difference,
Diſpute,
Quarrel,

Oppoſition of intereſts, cauſes *differences*. Contrariety of opinions, produces *diſputes*. Harſhneſs

Harſhneſs of diſpoſitions, is the ſource
quarrels.

We make up, the *difference.* We en
the *diſpute.* We appeaſe, the *quarrel.*

Envy and covetouſneſs, make, ſom
times, great *differences* for trifles. Prejud
and want of attention to what is ſa
commonly, prolong *diſputes.* *Quarr*
for the moſt part, proceed more from c
poſition, than animoſity.

103.

Ill,
Sick.

Theſe two words, are conſidered, onl
as ſynonymous, when they imply, afflict
with diſeaſe; but, as indiſcriminately,
they may be uſed, even in that ſenſe, ſti
they convey different ideas, marking dif
rent degrees of illneſs. The word *ill,*
my opinion, is uſed, with moſt propriet
when health is the leaſt impaired; that
ſick, when the body is greatly diſeaſe
Thus we ſay, when we find a heavin
upon the ſpirits, or, a want of appetit
th

that we are *ill*; but when the whole frame of any one is diſordered, we, naturally, ſay, he is *ſick*.

When we apply either of theſe words to ourſelves, they carry very different meanings; thus, I am *ill*, is general, and implies, diſordered, in any part of the body; whereas, I am *ſick*, is particular, and means, diſordered, in the ſtomach.

There is, yet, a further diſtinction between them; *Ill*, is moſt applicable, when in pain only; *ſick*, when diſeaſed; thus, we ſay, he is *ill* of the gout; but, *ſick*, of a fever.

104.

Diſeaſe,
Diſtemper,
Sickneſs.

Diſeaſe and *diſtemper*, imply, particular diſorders, with this difference, that, *diſeaſe* is more applicable to man; *diſtemper*, to brutes; whereas, *ſickneſs*, is more general, and may be applied to either.

Diſeaſes, ſuch as the plague, fevers, &c. are, ſometimes, ſo epidemical, as to lay

lay waſte more, than the ſword. *Diſtempers*, among cattle, are, generally, infectious. Divine diſpleaſure hath, often, ſhewn itſelf, by a general *ſickneſs*, among men and beaſts.

Both *diſeaſes* and *diſtempers*, when, become univerſal, are *ſickneſſes*, ſo ſevere, as draw the joint prayers of a people, in hopes, to avert them.

105.

Weary,
Tired,
Fatigued.

It is the continuation of the ſame thing, that either, *wearies*, or *tires*, with this difference, that, *weary*, implies, a leſs degree; *tired*, a greater; but it is labour that *fatigues*. We grow *weary*, or *tired* with ſtanding. We are *fatigued* with work.

When we are *weary* of a thing, to complete it, we lack ſpirits; when, *tired*, we are, totally, unable; when *fatigued*, we want ſtrength to go through it, as we would.

Wearineſs,

Wearineſs, proceeds, ſometimes, from an unwillingneſs, in what we undertake; we are, frequently, *tired*, through diſpoſition of body, and ſlow circulation of blood; but, *fatigue*, is, always, the conſequence of much action; it ſuppoſes exceſs of work, with reſpect, either to difficulty or length of time.

In a figurative ſenſe, a petitioner grows *weary*, through his impatience; *tired*, thro' his perſeverance; and *fatigued*, through his importunities.

We are *weary*, with waiting; *tired*, with ill-ſucceſs; and *fatigued* with purſuing.

Thus, may we be *weary*, and not *tired*; *tired*, yet, not *fatigued*.

106.

Light,
Brightneſs,
Splendor.

Light, is, the origin or commencement of *brightneſs*; *ſplendor*, is, *brightneſs* in perfection.

The

The intention of *light*, is, only, to make objects visible, that, of *brightneſs*, to make them, clearly, distinguishable and known: *ſplendor*, shews them, to the greatest degree of perfection.

It is *light* at day-break; *bright*, in the morning; *ſplendid*, at noon.

We attribute *light*, to the stars; *brightneſs*, to the moon; and *ſplendor*, to the sun.

107.

Luſtre,
Brilliancy,
Radiancy.

These three words, as the last, rise, gradually, one upon another, and mark the different degrees of the effect of light.

Luſtre, seems to be possessed of polish, only; *brilliancy*, of light; but, *radiancy*, of fire.

Luſtre, shines, only; *brilliancy*, dazzles; but, *radiancy*, glares.

We, seldom, make use of the word *luſtre*, but, in the literal sense; whereas, we, frequently, use that, of *radiancy*, and, much

much more often, that, of *brilliancy*, in the figurative. Conſidered then, in this ſenſe, it appears to me, that, it is the force of truth, the energy of language, and the newneſs of the thoughts, that give *radiancy*, to a diſcourſe; whereas, *brilliancy*, riſes from the beautiful turns and lively touches of expreſſion: and that, it is the choice of words, the agreement of terms, and the arrangement of phraſes, that give a *luſtre*, to what is ſaid.

108.

Wiſdom,
Prudence.

Wiſdom, makes us act and ſpeak, properly; *prudence*, prevents our ſpeaking, or acting, improperly. The firſt, in order to attain its ends, ſearches out the beſt paths to follow: the ſecond, that it may not miſs its aim, tries, to diſcover the bad ways, in order to avoid them.

Wiſdom, is more knowing; *prudence*, more wary.

The *wiſe* man, makes uſe of thoſe means, that are moſt proper for his purpoſe; he conducts himſelf, by the light of reaſon. The *prudent*, man, takes thoſe ways, he thinks moſt ſure; he does not venture, into places unknown.

An ancient writer, has ſaid, that, it is a mark of *wiſdom*, not to talk on any ſubject, but what, we are thorough maſters of, eſpecially, if we would be eſteemed: we, may add to this maxim, that, it is a piece of *prudence*, not to bring a diſagreeable ſubject on the tapis, particularly, if we are deſirous of being beloved.

109.

To *Find*,
Meet with.

We *find*, things, unknown, or, which we ſought after. We *meet with*, things, that are in our way, or, which preſent themſelves to us, unſought for.

The unfortunate, *find*, always, ſome reſource, in their misfortunes. People, who

readily unite themſelves with all the world, are liable to *meet with* bad company.

110.

Union,
Joining.

Union, relates, particularly, to two different things, which agree together. *Joining*, reſpects properly two diſtant things, which draw near together, one after the other.

The word, *union*, carrys with it an idea of agreement, and fitneſs: that, of *joining*, ſeems to ſuppoſe, ſome kind of motion.

We ſay, the *union*, of colours; and the *joining*, of armies: the *union*, of two neighbours; and the *joining*, of two rivers.

That, which is not *united*, is divided: that which is not *joined*, is ſeparated.

We *unite*, in order to form a ſociety. We *join*, for the ſake of company.

Union, is, often, uſed, in a figurative ſenſe; but *joining*, only, in the literal.

Union, is the ſupport of families, and the power of ſtates. The *joining* of many ſtreams, forms great rivers.

III.

Situation,
Condition,
State.

The words, *ſituation* and *condition*, imply, ſomething accidental, and tranſitory; with this difference, that *ſituation*, reſpects outward circumſtances; *condition*, thoſe, within the matter referred to; whereas, that of *ſtate*, implies, ſomething, more habitual, and laſting.

We, generally, uſe the word, *ſituation*, as relative, to affairs, rank or fortune; *condition*, with reſpect, to the nature, quality or property of a thing; and that, of *ſtate*, applying it to health, or, our well or ill-being.

We ſay, our *ſituation* is bad; when we are ſurrounded with difficulties: that a building is in bad *condition*; when out

of

of repair; and, that ſome perſons enjoy but an indifferent *ſtate* of health.

An ill-*ſtate* of health, added to a bad *ſituation* of affairs, is a *condition*, into which, every man muſt, naturally, dread the falling.

Such is the *condition*, and viciſſitude of human life, that, the moſt prudent men, have, often, found themſelves in perplexing *ſituations*; and from a *ſtate* of happineſs, have, as it were, through the perverſeneſs of fortune, fallen into one moſt wretched and deplorable.

112.

Of Faſhion,
Of Quality.

As ſynonymous, as theſe expreſſions may be, in the mouths of thoſe, who uſe them; they, ſtill, imply particular characters, in their right ſignification, when we are obliged, on certain occaſions, to expreſs ourſelves properly. The laſt of theſe expreſſions, riſes upon the firſt, and ſignifies the nobility; whereas, by the other, is, only, underſtood the gentry.

The pride and folly of the world is grown to ſo great a pitch, that perſons in trade, are, continually, apeing people of *of-faſhion*; and thoſe, *of-faſhion*, people *of-quality*.

113.

Notes,
Remarks,
Obſervations.

Notes, imply, a ſhortneſs and preciſion: *remarks*, a choice and diſtinction: *obſervations*, ſomething critical and far-fetched.

Notes, are, often, neceſſary: *remarks*, are, ſometimes, uſeful: *obſervations*, ſhould be, always, learned.

Change of manners and cuſtoms, for the moſt part, render authors in want of *notes*. There are as good *remarks*, perhaps, to be made upon the moderns, as upon the ancients. Hiſtorical *obſervations*, make antiquity more known.

114.

To *Take*,
Receive,
Accept.

We *take*, what, is given us. We *receive*, what, is ſent us. We *accept*, what, is offered us.

We *take*, money; we *receive*, favours; we *accept*, ſervices.

To *accept*, implys, always, conſent and approbation; to *receive*, does not; to *take*, excludes, only, refuſal.

No man ſhould ever *take* more, than his due. We ſhould, always, acknowledge thoſe civilities we have *received*. What, we have once *accepted*, ſhould, never afterwards be rejected.

115.

Sentiment,
Opinion,
Thought.

Theſe words are all in uſe, when the bare expreſſion, only, of ideas, is in queſtion. In this ſenſe, *ſentiment*, is more certain; it is a belief, raiſed by ſolid or apparent reaſons; *opinion*, is more doubtful; it is a judgement, built on ſome foundation: *Thought*, is ſtill leſs certain; ſpringing, only, from conjecture.

The word *ſentiment*, is uſed, with more propriety, when the ſubject, is on taſte. That, Homer is an excellent poet, is the *ſentiment*, of every man of learning. The word *opinion*, agrees beſt, when talking of ſcience. It is the general *opinion*, that the ſun, is the centre of the world. The word *thought*, is, more particularly, in uſe, when we are judging of the event of things or, the actions of men. Politicians have long *thought*, that, the Moſcovians would find a greater advantage from Aſia, than from Europe.

Senti-

Sentiments, are, in ſome meaſure, guided, by the influence of the heart; we, often, find them in favour of thoſe perſons we love. *Opinions*, are frequently, owing to prejudice; it is common for ſcholars, to have good ones for their maſters. *Thoughts*, riſe, greatly, from imagination; they are, often, chimerical.

116.

Reſolution,	*Bravery*,
Courage,	*Intrepidity*.
Valour,	

Reſolution, either baniſhes fear or ſurmounts it; it will not admit a falling back, but is ſtaunch on all occaſions. *Courage*, is impatient to attack; it undertakes boldly, and is not leſſened by difficulty. *Valour*, acts with vigour; it gives no way to reſiſtance, but, purſues its enterprize, in ſpite of oppoſition. *Bravery*, knows no fear; it runs nobly into danger, and prefers honour to life itſelf. *Intrepidity*, encounters the greateſt perils with the utmoſt coolneſs; and dares, even preſent, death.

The three firſt of theſe words, ſeem more relative to action, than the two laſt; and the two laſt, ſeem to imply, a greater fearfulneſs of danger, than the three firſt.

Reſolution, ſupports us in action. *Courage*, makes us advance. *Valour*, makes us execute. Through *bravery*, we expoſe ourſelves to danger. We would ſacrifice ourſelves through *intrepidity*.

Reſolution, ſhould never deſert us: *courage*, ſhould, always, determine us to do right: *valour*, would never make us deſpiſe the enemy: *bravery*, ſhould not pride itſelf in oppoſition: nor, ſhould *intrepidity*, itſelf, but, in caſes of duty or neceſ-

117.

Angry,
In a Paſſion,
Paſſionate.

An impatient agitation, or, riſing of the blood, againſt any one, who has offended us, is the common import of the two firſt, of theſe terms: The word, *angry*, implies, a paſſion more internal and laſting; whereas the expreſſion, *in a paſſion*, carries in its idea, a ſudden, external guſt of anger; ſhort, but violent.

Anger, ſhall, ſometimes, brood in the breaſt, for years; till at laſt it becomes, as it were, fixed and ſettled; ſometimes, it will diſſemble, for a long while together; but, often, finds it extremely difficult to pardon: On the contrary, it is the general characteriſtic of thoſe, who are *in a paſſion*, to forgive, as ſoon as it ſubſides; which may, perhaps, be the next quarter of an hour; beſides, the man, *in a paſſion*, cannot diſſemble; his violence of *anger*, muſt have vent; when that's obtained, he is as cool as before: indeed, his *paſſion*, will now and then, ſettle into confirmed

anger, but when that is the caſe, it is, generally, owing to repeated offences.

With reſpect to the word, *paſſionate*, there is a wide difference, between the man *in a paſſion*, and the *paſſionate* man; the one, being extraordinary, the other, ordinary.

Few men, for example, can avoid being *in a paſſion*, when, they are, greatly, offended; but *paſſionate* people, are heated, on the moſt trifling occaſions.

118.

Haſty,
Paſſionate.

According to my conception, it appears, that *haſty*, relates, more, to action or blows; and that, *paſſionate*, goes ſeldom farther, than words.

A *haſty* man, is apt to lift his hand; it is, generally, with him, a word and a blow. A *paſſionate* man, will vent his anger in words, only.

We ſhould be upon our guard, when, with *haſty* people; and have patience, with the *paſſionate*.

119.

Strong,	*Stout*,
Robuſt,	*Sturdy*.

Strength, is, chiefly, owing to the conſtruction of the muſcles. A little man is, often, *ſtronger*, than a greater. *Robuſtneſs*, carries with it, an idea of luſtineſs, is leſs ſubject to infirmities, and, much owing to conſtitution. A ſhort man, may be *robuſt*. By *ſtout*, we underſtand tall and ſtrong-made. A little man, tho' never ſo *ſtrong*, cannot be called, *ſtout*. By *ſturdy*, we mean *ſtout*, with a degree of hardineſs.

Strength, gives a man an advantage over his enemies; *robuſtneſs*, lends him, an air of dignity and authority; *ſtoutneſs*, makes him, admired; *ſturdineſs*, is accompanied, with an air of meanneſs.

120.

Complaiſant,
Polite,
Well-bred.

Complaiſance, riſes from the reſpect we ſhew thoſe, whom we meet; is, ſometimes, ſincere, ſometimes, not; *politeneſs*, from the flattering methods, we make uſe of in our behaviour and converſation; and is, generally, inſincere; but, to be *well-bred*, is to ſhew the ſame honours, always, with ſincerity.

Complaiſance, is the characteriſtic of the lover; *politeneſs*, of the courtier; but, to be *well-bred*, denotes, the gentleman.

We ſhould be *complaiſant*, without importunity; and *polite*, without inſipidity. The diſtinguiſhing mark of a *well-bred* man, is, the conſtant care he takes, never to diſguſt or offend.

121.

Hump-backed,
Crooked,
Deformed.

The true meaning of the word, *hump-backed*, is, having a riſing, upon the back, owing either to *crookedneſs*, or ſome other cauſe, and may be either natural or accidental: tho' the words, *crooked* and *deformed*, convey other ideas, ſtill nothing is more common, than to find them, frequently, in uſe to expreſs the ſame as *hump-backed*. By *crookedneſs*, is underſtood, any deviation from natural ſtraitneſs. *Deformity*, implies, any part of the body being imperfect or unnatural. Thus, a man is *crooked*, if any ways, twiſted or bent from the natural ſhape; and *deformed*, if he has an eye, a finger, or, a toe, too little, or, too much. We may be *hump-backed*, or, *crooked*, by a fall, or, ſome other accident; but *deformed*, we cannot be, otherwiſe, than by a defect or exuberance in nature.

A man may be *deformed*, and not *crooked*; *crooked*, yet, not *hump-backed*.

122.

Perfect,
Finiſhed,
Complete.

Perfection, regards, properly, the beauty, which riſes from the deſign and conſtruction of the work; *finiſhing*, from the workmanſhip and hand, of the workman. *Completion*, depends upon the want of nothing; but, on the work's having every thing, it ſhould have. The firſt, excludes all ſorts of defect. The ſecond, ſhews a particular care and attention, to the minuteſt article. The third, reſpects more, the totality of parts.

We may, eaſily, make a thing *complete*; and with much pains, *finiſh* it; but, after all, it may not be *perfect*.

123.

Misfortune,
Diſaſter,
Calamity.

Each, of theſe words, denotes, a ſad event; but, that, of *misfortune*, is applied to caſu-

caſualties, and, outward circumſtances, things detached from us. *Diſaſter*, reſpects, properly, perſonal accidents. *Calamity*, implies, ſomething, more general.

It is a *misfortune*, to loſe our money or our friend. It is a *diſaſter*, to fall or be wounded. It is a *calamity*, to find ourſelves, ſuddenly, diſgraced and ruined in the world.

We ſay, a great *misfortune*; a ſhocking *diſaſter*; and a dreadful *calamity*.

Misfortunes, will happen to the beſt of men. We bring *diſaſters*, frequently, upon ourſelves, thro' want of proper care. *Calamities*, are, often, ſent by heaven, upon the wicked, to rouſe them, from their ſinful lethargy.

124.

To *Conſent*, *Acquieſce*, *Agree*.

We *conſent*, to the will of others, by permitting. We *acquieſce*, in what is propoſed, by conforming. We *agree*, to what is ſaid, by approving.

We

We, naturally, oppoſe, what, we do not *conſent* to; diſcourage, what, we will not *acquieſce* in; and, diſpute, what, we cannot *agree* to.

It appears to me, that, the word, *conſent*, ſuppoſes ſome authority, in the perſon *conſenting*; that, of *acquieſce*, ſome ſubmiſſion, in the perſon *acquieſcing*; and that, the word *agree*, denotes, ſome averſion to diſpute.

Parents, *conſent*, to the marriage of their children. Parties, *acquieſce*, in the decree of a judge. Well-bred perſons, *agree*, almoſt, to every thing.

125.

Management,	*Conduct*,
Direction,	*Government*.
Adminiſtration,	

Management, reſpects, only, private things, truſted to the care of ſome one, to employ for the profit of another, and, to whom, he is to render an account; as that of a clerk, to his maſter. *Direction*, relates to certain affairs, where, there is a diſtribution, either of money, office or whatever elſe,

elſe, is committed to the care of another, to preſerve neceſſary order. *Adminiſtration*, refers to objects of greater conſequence, ſuch, as thoſe of juſtice, or, the finances of a ſtate; it ſuppoſes a pre-eminence of employ, which gives power, credit, and, a kind of liberty, in the department, the perſon is engaged in. *Conduct*, points out ſome knowledge and ability, with reſpect to things; and, a ſubordination, with regard to perſons. *Government*, reſults from authority and dependance; it indicates a ſuperiority of office, with a particular relation, to policy.

Whoſoever has the *management* of any one's concerns in truſt; ſhould be as attentive and as careful, as if they were his own. He, who undertakes the *direction* of public charities; ſhould diveſt himſelf of all prejudice and partiality. A judge ought to be wiſely circumſpect in the *adminiſtration* of juſtice; and, a prime miniſter intently wary, in the *adminiſtration* of public affairs. No one thing ſhould be committed to the *conduct* of another, unleſs, we are well perſwaded, he has abilities, adequate to the taſk; and will act in conformity, to the intentions of him, whoſe

buſineſ

buſineſs he undertakes. The man, who, thro' favour of his prince, is offered the helm of *government*; ſhould, ſeriouſly, reflect on the arduous office; and not ſuffer his ambition, to get the better of his diſcretion.

126.

Affront,
Inſult,
Abuſe,

Affront, is an arrow of reproach and contempt, ſhot in public; it piques and mortifies thoſe, who have any ſenſe of honour. *Inſult*, is an attack, made with inſolence; it is, uſually, repelled with ſpirit. Both *affronts* and *inſults*, may be given without words; but, *abuſe* reſults, chiefly, from ſcurrilous language.

Affronts, are, often, given through the childiſh itch of revenge. *Inſults*, are, too frequently the offspring of pride. We ſeldom, if ever, hear *abuſe*, in the mouth of a well-bred man.

Happy

Happy is that perſon, that can put up *affronts*, with compoſure; bear *inſults*, with calmneſs; and, turn a deaf ear, to *abuſe*.

127.

To,
In order, to.

Theſe terms are ſynonymous in that ſenſe, where, they ſignify, doing one thing, in view of another; but the word, *to*, denotes, a nearer view; the expreſſion, *In order, to*, one, farther off.

We get introduced to a prince, *to* make our court: we make our court to him, *in order, to* obtain his favours.

The word, *to*, ſeems to agree beſt, when what we do, in view of ſome other thing, is, almoſt, certain to take effect. The expreſſion, *in order, to*, appears to be uſed, with moſt propriety, when the thing we have in view, may not be the immediate conſequence.

We fire cannon, againſt a beſieged place, *to* make a breach, and *in order, to* take

take it, by aſſault, or, oblige the enemy to ſurrender.

To, reſpects, more particularly, an effect, which ought to be produced. *In order*, *to*, regards, properly, an aim, which we would obtain.

Young women, at a certain age, do all they can *to* pleaſe, *in order*, *to* procure themſelves, huſbands.

128.

Outſide,
Appearance.

In the literal ſenſe; it is, the walls, the ditches, the courts, the gardens, the avenues that forms the *outſide* of a caſtle; but it is, the figures, the grandeur, the ſituation, and, the architecture, that determines the *appearance*: the *outſide*, being the external part of a thing; the *appearance*, the effect, which a view of that thing produces, or the idea, we form of it, by that view.

In the figurative ſenſe; *outſide*, is, oftner, applied to our manners, and, our way of living: *appearance*, ſeems to be more in uſe

uſe, with reſpect to our actions and our conduct.

A brilliant *outſide*, is no certain proof, of a good fortune. Going, frequently, to church, is an *appearance*, that can determine little, with regard to virtue.

129.

Viſion,
Apparition.

A *viſion*, paſſes, inwardly, in the mind; and, is ſuppoſed to be, only, an action of the imagination. An *apparition*, ſtrikes the ſenſes, outwardly, and, is ſuppoſed to be, an object from without.

Joſeph was warned by a *viſion*, to fly into Egypt, with his family. Mary Magdelen was informed of the reſurrection of our Saviour, by an *apparition*.

Feveriſh perſons, often, think they ſee *viſions*. Timid and credulous people, ſometimes, take trees or poſts, for *apparitions*; and, frequently, objects of their own imagination.

130.

To *See*,
Perceive.

Objects, that have ſome duration, or, that ſhew themſelves, are *ſeen*; thoſe, that paſs by quickly, or, are hid, in ſome meaſure, from the eye, are, only, *perceived.*

We *ſee* the face, and, by that, *perceive* the diſpoſition of the heart.

In a crowded court, thoſe, who ſtand forward, are *ſeen*, by the prince; while others, behind, are ſcarcely *perceived.*

131.

To *Fear*, be *Apprehenſive*, | To *Dread*, be *Afraid.*

We *fear*, an ill; through a natural averſion to it, and, from a ſenſe, that it may happen to us: we are *apprehenſive*, of loſing a benefit; through an eager deſire to obtain it, and, from a conviction that we never may: we *dread*, our adverſary; through ſentiments of eſteem, when we know

know him our ſuperior: we are *afraid* of danger; through a timid diſpoſition.

Want of courage, makes us *fear:* Doubt of ſucceſs, makes us *apprehenſive:* Diſtruſt of ſtrength, makes us *dread.* Imagination itſelf, will, often, make us *afraid.*

Common people *fear* death, more than any thing: the Epicureans were, much more, in *fear* of pain; but gentlemen, are of opinion, they ought to fear nothing, ſo much as infamy. The more, ardently, we wiſh for a thing, the more we *apprehend* the loſing of it. Whatever merit, an author may flatter himſelf that he has, he ſhould always *dread* the judgment of the public. Women, who are *afraid* of nothing, but loſing their reputation; do honour to their ſex.

132.

To *Teach*, *Learn*, *Inſtruct.*

To *teach*, is, only, to give leſſons; to *learn*, is, to give leſſons, with ſucceſs: both which words, relate more to thoſe

things, that are proper to cultivate the mind, and, form a good education; for, which reaſon, we uſe them with propriety, when the arts and ſciences, are in queſtion. To *inſtruct*, has a greater relation, to that, which is uſeful, in the conduct of life and ſucceſs of affairs; it is, therefore, in its proper place, when ſpeaking of any thing, that concerns either our duty, or, our intereſt.

Profeſſors *teach*, in public ſchools, thoſe, who come to hear them. The hiſtorian *learns*, poſterity, the events of his times. A father *inſtructs*, his children, how they ought to live in the world.

It requires great knowledge, to *teach* method and plainneſs, to *learn* others; experience and abilities, to *inſtruct*.

Many perſons attempt to *teach*, what, they have occaſion to ſtudy themſelves. Some will undertake to *learn* others, what, they, themſelves, are, almoſt ignorant of. Very few, are capable of *inſtructing*.

133.

Gentle,
Tame.

Gentle animals, are, naturally ſo; *tame* ones, are ſo, partly by the art and induſtry of man.

The dog, the ox, and, the horſe, are *gentle* animals; the bear, and, the lion, are ſometimes, *tame.*

134.

To *Bind,*
Tie.

We *bind,* to prevent the limbs moving, or, the parts of a thing ſeparating; we *tie,* to ſtop a thing, or, prevent its going any farther.

We *bind* the feet and hands of a criminal; and, we *tie* him to a ſtake.

In the figurative ſenſe, a man is *bound,* when he is not at liberty to act; and, he is *tied,* when he cannot change his party, or, quit it.

Authority and power *bind*: intereſt and love *tie*.

We do not think ourſelves *bound*, when we ſee not our bonds; and, we do not imagine ourſelves *tied*, when we have no occaſion to uſe our liberty.

135.

To *Hope*.
Expect.

The firſt of theſe words has, for its object, ſucceſs in itſelf, and denotes, a truſt, born up by ſome encouragement. The ſecond, regards, particularly, the happy moment of event, and intimates, a certainty of its arriving; we *hope*, to obtain things: we *expect*, their coming.

We ſhould always *hope*, for the indulgence of heaven; and, *expect*, without murmuring, the hour of Providence.

What we *hope* for, ſeems to be more a favour or a kindneſs; what we *expect*, more a duty or obligation. Thus, we *hope*, for favourable anſwers to our demands; and, we *expect*, ſuch as are agreeable to our propoſitions.

I *hope*,

I *hope*, my work will meet with the taſte of the public; and, I *expect*, an equitable ſentence.

136.

Weight,
Influence,
Sway.

Taking theſe words in the ſenſe, of having power over the minds of others; *weight*, implies, prevalence, tho' ſmall; *influence*, ſeems to have more force; *ſway*, is more abſolute.

Superiority of rank and reaſon, gives *weight*; it is commonly by perſuaſion, that it acts. Attachment to perſons contributes much to the *influence*, they have over us; it is by ſollicitation, it prevails. The art of finding out and taking advantage of the weakneſs of men, forms the *ſway*, we bear over them; 'tis by watching their motion, that we ſucceed.

The *weight* we have with others, proceeds, always, from ſome worth, in ourſelves, either of mind, birth or fortune. *Influence* is owing to ſome tye, either of

heart or intereſt. *Sway*, riſes from an aſcendency, arrogated by art, or, ceded to us, thro' weakneſs.

A perſon of *weight*, has ſucceeded, ſometimes, when arguments would have no force. *Influence*, on ſome occaſions, hath wrought, almoſt, miracles, effecting that, which money could not bring to bear. *Sway*, is a wonderful operator on weak minds: procuring that, through art, which no other thing can, poſſibly, obtain.

What perverſeneſs then, can poſſibly withſtand a man of ſome *weight* in himſelf; whoſe *influence* is great, and, who knows how to bear a proper *ſway*.

137.

Authority,
Power,
Dominion,

We find in the word, *authority*, ſufficient energy to make us perceive a right, either of civil or politic adminiſtration. There is in the word, *power*, a particular relation to the ſubordinate execution of ſuperior

ſuperior orders. The word, *dominion*, carries with it, an idea of empire.

It is the law, which gives *authority*; it deriving all its might, from thence. *Power*, is inveſted in delegates, thoſe, to whom the execution of the laws is entruſted, and is, conſequently, in ſubordination to *authority*. *Dominion*, ſprings from the joint conſent of the people, or, from the force of arms, and, is either lawful or tyrannical.

We are happy, in living under the *authority* of a Prince, who prides himſelf in juſtice; whoſe miniſters aſſume no *power*, beyond what is legal; and, who makes the welfare of his ſubjects, the baſis of his *dominion*.

Authority, if weak, is expoſed to contempt; it is, equally, as dangerous, not to make uſe of it on proper occaſions, as, even, to abuſe it. A blind *power*, which acts in oppoſition to juſtice, becomes odious, and paves the way to its own ruin. A jealous *dominion*, that admits of no ſharer, makes itſelf formidable; awakens, on that account, the ardor of its enemies, and, thus, uſhers in its own fall.

There appears to me, particularly, in the idea of *authority*, ſomething juſt and reſpectable; in the idea of *power*, ſomething ſtrong and active; and, in the idea of *dominion*, ſomething great and elevated.

As there is none but God, that has an unlimited *authority*; ſo, there is none elſe, who has infinite *power*; neither is there any abſolute, ſovereign, and independent *dominion*, than his.

Nature has eſtabliſhed no *authority* among men, but that of fathers, over their children; all other, proceeds from poſitive right. The *power* of the paſſions, is the true ſpring of action, and, determines us, with reſpect, either to good or evil. It is not only by the diſpoſition of human laws, that marriage places the woman under the *dominion* of the man; but, it is, alſo, ſo ſettled by the divine.

138.

Volume,
Book.

A *volume*, may contain many *books*: A *book*, may make many *volumes*. The bind-

binding, properly, diſtinguiſhes the *volumes*; and, the diviſion of the work, the *books*.

We muſt not, always, judge of the knowledge of an author, by the largeneſs of the *volume*. Works are, ſometimes, ſpread out into many *books*, which would be more valuable, were they reduced to one.

139.

To *have a Mind, for,*	To *Hanker after,*
Long for,	*Luſt after.*
Wiſh for,	

The laſt, of theſe expreſſions, is more uſed in theology, and ſuppoſes, always, an illicit object, forbid by the laws of God; thus, we *luſt after* a woman; or, the goods of another. The others, are all, in common uſe, and, expreſs our inclination to a thing, be it what it will; with the following difference between them. We, *have a mind, for,* or, *long for,* a preſent object; but, *have a mind,* ſeems attended with more knowledge and reflection; *long for,* more opinion and more taſte: we *wiſh for* things, farther

diſtant: we *hanker after* things, that more affect us.

Princes, ſometimes, *have a mind*, to gratify their ambition, at the expence of their future welfare. Women with child, frequently, *long for* moſt things they ſee: Lazy people, often, ſit down and content themſelves, with *wiſhing for* thoſe things, they would, preſently, obtain, if diligent and aſſiduous. Some children will *hanker*, a long time, *after* their nurſes, and, it is with the greateſt difficulty, they can be brought to forget them.

140.

Gain,	*Lucre*,
Profit,	*Emolument*.

Gain, ſeems to ariſe from ſomething very caſual; and implies, riſk and hazard; it is for this reaſon, the word, is in great uſe among gameſters and tradeſmen. *Profit*, appears to be more ſure; proceeding either from lands or induſtry. Thus, we ſay, the *profits* of the earth; or, the *profits* of our labour. The characteriſtic of *lucre*, conſiſts in a ſimple relation, to the paſſion of intereſt; 'tis on this account, we

we ſay, with the greateſt propriety, that man is fond of *lucre*. *Emolument* relates to commiſſions and employments; intimating, not only the ſalaries, but, all other perquiſites.

Some perſons are ſo particularly rigid, as to condemn all *gain*, ariſing from play. Many will, idly, call that *profit*, which has accrued by illicit means. It is low and ſordid, to be ever led by *lucre*. We do, not, always, find the greateſt honour, in offices, where there is the greateſt *emolument*.

141.

Very,
Extremely.

We are apt to uſe theſe words indifferently, one as well as the other, to expreſs a great degree of any thing. Thus, for example, we ſay, in the ſame ſenſe, *very* wiſe; *extremely* wiſe; notwithſtanding this, there appears to me ſome difference between them: The word, *very*, marks an extraordinary degree; but *extremely*, a degree to admiration. Thus, we ſay, men

are, *very*, wicked: Providence is, *extremely*, kind.

Beſides this diſtinction, there is one more delicate, which is, that *very*, does not ſuit well, but in the literal and natural ſenſe; for when we ſay, a man is *very* wiſe; we would be underſtood, as ſaying; truly wiſe, whereas *extremely*, may be uſed with elegance, in an ironical ſenſe. We ſay, then, in raillery, he is, *extremely*, wiſe, in ceaſing to purſue that, he knows not how to get at; and, *extremely*, patient, in taking a blow calmly, he has not the ſpirit to return.

242.

Fantaſtical,	*Maggotty*,
Whimſical,	*Fanciful*,

Of theſe words, that of *fantaſtical*, implies, a rambling from true taſte, thro' exceſs of delicacy, or, an unſeaſonable ſearch after ſomething better. That of *whimſical*, means, an affectation of ſingularity. By *maggotty*, is underſtood, a great inconſtancy, or, ſudden change of taſte. *Fanciful*, implies, a certain revolution of humour, or, a particular way of thinking.

There

There cannot be a more deſpicable creature, than the *fantaſtical* fop; he tricks out his charming ſelf, in hopes of attracting the reſpect of mankind; but, on the contrary, meets, only, with ſcorn and contempt. The *whimſical* man, if his invention be fertile, is, ſometimes, an object of preſent admiration; but, on ſerious reflection, is, too frequently, the ſubject of ridicule. A *maggotty* perſon, is, equally, tireſome to himſelf and to others; as what pleaſes him, one minute, ſhall, often, diſpleaſe him, the next. He, who is *fanciful*, is far more troubleſome to himſelf, than to others; for being led away by his wild imagination, he, fondly, believes many things to be real, which, in fact are, only, ideal.

141.

Capacity,
Ability.

Capacity, has more relation to the knowledge of things; *ability*, to their application. The one, is acquired, by ſtudy; the other, by practice.

He, who has *capacity* for a thing, is pro-

per to undertake; he, who has *ability*, to execute.

144.

Little, *Small.*

The word, *little*, ſometimes, ſignifies, only, want of bigneſs; and, at other times, want of greatneſs, in every ſenſe; whereas that of *ſmall*, is the oppoſite, only, to bigneſs, and, ſuppoſes ſome kind of length. Thus, we ſay, a *little* houſe; a *little* man; a *little* cup; a *little* globe: but, a *ſmall* thread; a *ſmall* line; a *ſmall* twig.

145.

To *Remark*, *Obſerve.*

To *remark*, implies, taking notice, with attention, in order, to remember: to *obſerve*, means, rather, to watch, with examination, by way of paſſing our judgement.

The traveller *remarks*, that, which ſtrikes him moſt; the ſpy, *obſerves* thoſe proceedings, which he thinks of conſequence.

It

It is the part of a general to *remark* thoſe, of his men, who diſtinguiſh themſelves in battle; and, *obſerve* the motions, of the enemy.

We may *obſerve*, in order, to *remark*; but cuſtom will not admit of an inverſion of the phraſe.

Thoſe, who *obſerve* the conduct of others, in order, to *remark* their faults; do it, rather, through a delight in cenſuring, than, a deſire of correcting their own errors.

146.

To *go Back*, *Return.*

We *go back*, from a place, where we have, ſome conſiderable time, been. We *return*, to a place, we had, juſt before left. Thus, we ſay, he is *gone back* into his own country. He is *returned* home. We ſay, alſo, he is *gone back* from virtue; he has *returned* to his fault.

147.

Idea,	*Imagination*,
Thought.	*Notion*.

The *idea*, repreſents the object; *thought*, conſiders it; *imagination*, forms it; thus worked up, it becomes a *notion*. The firſt, only, points; the ſecond, examines; the third, ſeduces; but, the laſt, draws.

When in converſation, our *ideas* are juſt; our *thoughts*, fine; and, our *imaginations*, brilliant; we ſhall be ſure to pleaſe: and, our *notions*, tho' ſingular, will, always, be reſpectable.

148.

Buſineſs,
Affairs.

Buſineſs, implies, an object of induſtry; *affairs*, an object of concern. The firſt, employs the hands; the ſecond, the mind. The word, *buſineſs*, by its having no plural number, intimates a particular employ; by the ſingular of *affairs*, being ſeldom in uſe, in the ſenſe before us, that word is underſtood

underſtood to mean, a variety of tranſactions.

The man of much *buſineſs*, ought to have a ſtrong conſtitution. He, who has many *affairs* to ſettle, tho' he may have a clear head, will find it difficult, to adjuſt them all, to his ſatisfaction.

He, who, continually, interferes with the *buſineſs* of others, neglecting his own *affairs*, makes himſelf an object of ridicule; and, merits the contempt of mankind.

149.

To *Take*, *Chooſe*.

When we would *take* a thing, we determine upon one, becauſe, we cannot have all. We *chooſe*, by comparing things, becauſe, we would have the beſt. The one, ſuppoſes a ſimple determination of the will; the other, a diſcernment of the mind.

Between two things, exactly alike, we may determine, which to *take*, when at the ſame time, there is no *choice*.

We

We are ſometimes conſtrained to *take* one thing, out of many, when we are not obliged to *chooſe*.

We cannot uſe the word *take*, but, with reſpect to ourſelves; but we *chooſe*, ſometimes, for others.

It is a point of good-manners, when offered fruit or any other thing, where there is *choice*; to *take*, that, which comes firſt to hand: but, when we would preſent any thing of the like ſort, to a ſtranger, it is a mark of politeneſs, to *chooſe* for him the beſt.

When things are at our *option*, that is, when we may *take*, which we pleaſe; we ſhould try to make a good *choice*.

Between a good courſe of life and a bad, there is no medium; we muſt either *take* the one or the other. Nothing appears more difficult to me, than the *choice* of a friend.

If, in a journey, there were, only, two roads, to *take*; the one, ſhort, but, bad; the other, long, but, good; I ſhould, certainly, *chooſe* the laſt.

150.

To *Chooſe*,
Make choice of

The word, *chooſe*, is moſt, in its place, with reſpect to things, we would make uſe of. The expreſſion, *make choice of*, is, more proper, when it relates to perſons, we would appoint to any dignity or employ.

George, the third, *choſe*, the Queen's palace, as his place of reſidence in town; and, *made choice of* Cæſar Hawkins, to inoculate his children.

To *chooſe*, indicates, more particularly, a compariſon made between things, in order, to know, which is beſt to take; to *make choice of*, marks with greater preciſion, the ſimple determination of one perſon preferable to another.

Princes do not, always, *chooſe* their miniſters; neither, do they, always, *make choice of* a Talbot, for a chancellor; nor, a Marlborough, for a general.

151.

To *Chooſe*, *Prefer*.

We do not, always, *chooſe*, what, we *prefer*: but, we ever *prefer*, that, which we *chooſe*.

To *chooſe*, is, to determine in favour of a thing, either on account of its merit, or, its value. To *prefer*, is, to determine in its favour, by any motive whatſoever; whether it be merit, affection, good-manners, policy, or, what not.

'Tis the judgment, that makes the *choice*; the heart, that gives the *preference*. 'Tis for this reaſon, that we, commonly, *chooſe*, what, we are acquainted with; and, *prefer*, what, we love.

Prudence, ſometimes, forbids our *chooſing* that, which ſtrikes the eye moſt. Juſtice will not, often, permit us to *prefer* our friends, to other people.

In *chooſing* a ſtate of life, I think there can be no harm in *preferring* that, which is moſt agreeable to our inclinations; as, in

ſo

ſo doing, we ſhould, naturally, find more ſatisfaction in our duty.

Choice, is either good or bad, according to our taſte, or, the knowledge we have in things. *Preference*, is, either juſt or unjuſt, as reaſon dictates, or, paſſion inſpires.

Partial *preference*, is, ſometimes, allowed to princes in the diſtribution of their honours; but, they ſhould, always, make *choice* of the ableſt men, in their appointments to public offices.

152.

Meat,
Fleſh.

By the word, *Meat*, is underſtood, any kind of food; but *fleſh*, ſignifies, only, the natural compoſition of an animal. Thus, we ſay, that fiſh and vegetables are proper *meats* for Lent; and, that the *fleſh* of a partridge, is very white and tender.

Grain is the *meat* of birds; *fleſh*, the food of beaſts.

153.

153.

Reformation,
Reform.

Reformation, ſignifies, often, the action of reforming; *reform*, ſeldom any other than, the effect.

A general *reformation* of manners, among the people, will ever be found a very difficult and laborious taſk. When we have not been able to complete a thing to our ſatisfaction, by any ſort of amendment, we have, often, brought it to bear, by a thorough *reform*.

154.

Smooth,
Level.

That, which is not rough, is *ſmooth*. That, which is free from either hollows or riſings, is *level*.

The *ſmootheſt* marble is the beſt. A country, where there is neither hills nor valleys, is *level*.

155.

To *Fade*,
Wither.

Of theſe two words, *wither*, riſes up-that of *fade*. A flower, which is *faded*, may recover; but that, whichis *withered*, can not.

Beauty, like a flower, *fades* through length of time; and may *wither*, ſuddenly, by an accident.

156.

Prerogative,
Privilege.

Prerogative, relates to honour, and perſonal preference; it riſes principally, from ſubordination, or, from the relation, perſons bear among themſelves: whereas, *privilege*, implies, ſome advantage from intereſt or office, proceeding from the grant of a prince, or, the laws of a ſociety.

Birth, gives *prerogatives*. Offices, give *privileges*.

157.

Knowing,
Diſcerning.

The *knowing* man, acts ſurely, he ſeldom deceives himſelf; yet, knowledge of life, only, is his fort. The *diſcerning* man, is clear-ſighted and judicious, ſees thro' the artifices of mankind, with half an eye, and, will not ſuffer himſelf to be deceived; his great abilities conſiſt, in diſtinguiſhing.

The ſtudy of man, will make a perſon *knowing*; but, it requires great experience, and, a long attention, both to men and books, to render him *diſcerning*.

An artful, ingenious rogue, will, ſometimes, take in the *knowing*, by a novel deceit; through the fallacy of which, the *diſcerning* man, ſhall, readily, penetrate.

158.

Order,
Regularity.

Each, of theſe words, implies, a prudent diſpoſition of things; but, that, of *order*, relates, more, to the effect, which reſults from ſuch a diſpoſition; that, of *regularity*, more, to the power, and, to the model, that conducts that diſpoſition.

We obſerve *order*, in conformance to *regularity*. The firſt, is the effect, of the ſecond.

159.

Traffic,
Trade,
Commerce,

Traffic, relates, more, to the exchange of merchandiſe; *trade*, and, *commerce*, to that, of buying and ſelling; with this difference, that *trade*, ſeems to imply the manufacturing and vending of merchandiſe within ourſelves; *commerce*, negociating with other countries.

We *traffic*, with nations, that have not the uſe of money; by bartering one kind of merchandiſe, for another. *Trade*, is looked upon by the wiſeſt of men, to be the ſupport of every ſtate; as the proſperity of a kingdom depends, in a great meaſure, upon its riches; and, riches, is the immediate effect of *trade*. The great and extenſive *commerce*, that England holds with other nations, makes us, the glory and admiration of the world.

160.

Exchange,
Truck,
Barter.

The word, *exchange*, means, ſimply, in a general ſenſe, the act of exchanging one thing for another, be it, what it may: the other two, are in uſe to denominate the particular kinds or methods of *exchange*; of which, this is the difference, that, the word, *truck*, is uſed, with moſt propriety, when ſpeaking of ſerviceable things, ſuch as are moveable; as the *trucking* of horſes, trinkets, utenſils, &c. Whereas,

barter,

barter, is a more mercantile expreſſion, and intimates the *exchange* of different commodities, by way of traffic. Thus, ſo little are the natives of Guinea acquainted, with the value of gold, that, they hold commerce with other nations, by *bartering* it away for glaſs, and, other trifling ornaments.

161.

Regard,	*Veneration*,
Eſteem,	*Reſpect*.

When we entertain a good opinion of a man, we are ſaid, to *regard* him; when that *regard* increaſes, we call it *eſteem*; we teſtify that *eſteem*, by *veneration*; and prove it, by ſubmiſſion, through *reſpect*.

We have a natural *regard* for a quiet neighbour; we *eſteem* him if he ſtudies the good of the neighbourhood; if we perceive in him any eminent qualities, we hold him in *veneration*; and, in proportion, to the rank he is in above us, either by birth or fortune, we treat him, with leſs or greater *reſpect*.

Being born in the ſame country, claims *regard*. Civility creates *eſteem*. Age and

merit, render *venerable*; rank and dignity, *reſpectable*.

162.

Retinue,
Train.

Retinue, implies, a number of followers; *train*, the ſame, with order. Thus, his coach was attended, with ſo great a *retinue*, that, there was no ſeeing the carriage, for duſt. It was cuſtomary, in a Roman triumph, to have, always, a number of captive ſlaves, in the *train*.

163.

Occaſion,
Occurrence,
Conjuncture,
Caſe,
Circumſtance.

Occaſion, is uſed, for the arrival of ſomething new, whether it be that, which preſents itſelf, or what, we ſeek; and, in a ſenſe, as indeterminate with reſpect to time, as the object. *Occurrence*, is, only, in uſe, to expreſs that, which happens unexpect-

expectedly, and with relation to the time preſent. We make uſe of the word, *conjuncture*, to mark a ſituation proceeding from a concurrence of events, whether of buſineſs or intereſt. *Caſe*, is employed to ſignify, the main point, with a ſpecial reference to the ſort and ſingularity of the thing in queſtion. *Circumſtance*, carries with it no other idea, than that of ſomething additional, accompanying another, which is principal.

We know people on particular *occaſions*. We ſhould demean ourſelves, according to the *occurrence* of the times. It is, commonly, the *conjunctures*, that determines us, which ſide to take. It has been pretended, that there are *caſes*, in which, reaſon would condemn, even an attention to virtue. Diverſity of *circumſtances*, will make the ſame man, think differently, upon the ſame ſubject.

164.

Uncertainty,
Doubt,
Suſpence.

In that ſenſe, in which, theſe words are accounted ſynonymous, they, all three, imply indetermination: but, *uncertainty* riſes, when the event of things is unknown. *Doubt*, when the mind knows not how to chooſe. By *ſuſpence*, is underſtood, an indetermined ſtate, when the mind is held in expectation.

We are in *uncertainty*, with reſpect to the ſucceſs of our proceedings; in *doubt*, what ſtep to take; in *ſuſpence*, when we are held from acting, by a delay of certainty.

Uncertainty, requires caution; *doubt*, conſideration; *ſuſpence*, patience.

A wiſe man is ſeldom *uncertain*, as to what ſhall happen; he foreſees future events, and prepares himſelf for them. When we are in *doubt*, and at a loſs to determine; we ſhould leave the matter to the deciſion of others. Of all ſtates of indetermination, that of *ſuſpence*, is the moſt vexati-

vexatious, and the only remedy, is a quiet reſignation.

165.

Right,
Juſtice.

Right, is the object of *juſtice*; and that, which is due to every one. *Juſtice*, is the conformity of our actions, with *right*; it is to render and ſecure to every one that which is his due. The firſt, is dictated by nature, or, eſtabliſhed by authority, either divine or human; and is, according to circumſtances, ſometimes, liable to change. The ſecond, is the rule, we ſhould, always, follow, and, is, ever, invariable.

It is conſiſtent with the laws of *juſtice*, to uſe the ſame means, in ſupport and defence of our *rights*, as are, often, employed to attack them.

166.

Dejected,	*Low-ſpirited,*
Melancholy,	*Dull.*

Dejection, is, commonly, cauſed by great affliction, and is, too often, a mark of deſpair. *Melancholy*, is, generally, the effect of conſtitution; its cloudy ideas overpower and baniſh all that are chearful. *Low-ſpiritedneſs*, is involuntary, and, often, proceeds from a weakneſs of nerves: exceſs of joy, fatigue, bad digeſtion, will occaſion it. *Dullneſs*, on the contrary, is voluntary; it ariſes, frequently, from diſcontent, diſappointment, and from any other circumſtance that may diſpleaſe the mind.

The mind, in *dejection*, is unhappy, not having ſufficient ſtrength and reaſon to get the better of it. *Melancholy*, will, ſometimes, wear away, by frequent diverſion and diſſipation. A perſon, ſubject to *low-ſpirits*, ſhould purſue a regular courſe of life, and a uniform method of living. *Dullneſs* is encreaſed by giving way to it; it is in our power to baniſh it, whenever we pleaſe, and the damp it throws on every company, one

one would imagine, ſhould be our greateſt inducement, to do it.

The reverſe of *dejection*, is joy; the reverſe of *melancholy*, chearfulneſs; gaiety is the oppoſite, to *low-ſpiritedneſs*; and ſprightlineſs, to *dullneſs*.

167.

Piercing, *Penetrating*.

The word, *piercing*, implies, great ſtrength of light, and, a ſtroke of the eye; that, of *penetrating*, great force of attention, and, reflexion.

A *piercing* mind, ſees things, even, through the veils, that cover them; it is difficult, to conceal truth from it; it will not ſuffer itſelf, to be deceived. A mind that *penetrates*, reaches to the bottom of things, without ſtopping at the ſurface; it is not eaſy to deceive it, neither will it ſuffer itſelf, to be amuſed.

Beſides the above diſtinction, *piercing*, ſeems to be executed, by a ſudden glance; *penetrating*, by making way gradually.

168.

To *Put*,
Place.

Put, ſeems to have a general ſenſe; *place*, one more limited, meaning to *put*, orderly, and, in a proper place.

We *put* columns, to ſupport an edifice: we *place* them, with ſymmetry.

169.

Diſcernment,
Judgment.

Diſcernment, relates, not only, to a thing itſelf, but, alſo, to its appearances; and, is a diſtinguiſhing knowledge, that prevents the confounding of one thing, with another. *Judgment*, relates to a thing conſidered in itſelf, only in order, to inveſtigate the truth; and, is a knowledge that determines. The firſt, is limited to things preſent; its office is to diſcern truth from falſehood, perfections from defects, motives from pretexts: the ſecond, prys, even, into futurity; diſcovers the relation, and, con-

conſequence of things, foreſeeing their effects. In ſhort, we may ſay, of *diſcernment*, that, it is knowing; that, it renders our ideas, juſt; and, of *judgment*, that, it is wiſe; that, it makes our conduct, diſcreet.

When choice, or, determination, with reſpect to the goodneſs, or, beauty of objects, is in queſtion, we ſhould have recourſe to thoſe, who have *diſcernment*. When we would take any ſtep of conſequence, we ſhould take the advice of ſuch perſons, as have *judgment*.

Arts and ſciences require *diſcernment*; which is, more or leſs nice, according to the delicacy of the underſtanding, or, the extent of knowledge. Government, and, the policy of ſtates demand *judgment*; which is, more or leſs, ſure, according to the force of reaſon, and, the length of experience.

170.

Satisfied,
Contented.

We are *satisfied*, when, we have obtained, what we wiſhed for: We are *contented*, when, we wiſh not for any more.

It happens, often, that, when, well *satisfied*, we are not the more *content*.

Poſſeſſion will, always, prove *satisfactory*; but it is the true enjoyment, only, of what we poſſeſs, that can make us *content*.

171.

Tale,	*Romance,*
Novel,	*Story.*

Each, of theſe words, implies, a ſmall hiſtory, or, an entertaining relation of adventures: the three firſt, are ſuppoſed to be fabulous, and, made public; whereas, the laſt, may be either true, or, feigned, and told either in print, or, by word of mouth; but, as they carry ideas peculiar to themſelves, it is my buſineſs, to point them out: by the word, *tale*, then, is meant, a

ſhort, but dreſſed-up narrative of ſome ſingle adventure; that, of *novel*, ſignifies, an amuſing hiſtory, made up of many adventures, and, carried on through one, or, more volumes. By *romance*, is underſtood, a collection of wild adventures, in love and war.

Tales, ought to be well related; *novels*, well invented; *romances*, well carried on; *ſtories*, well told.

Tales, if attended with good morals, are not, only, amuſing, but, inſtructive. *Novels*, are of no other uſe, than to entertain; they waſte the time, without making the leaſt improvement. *Romances* ſpoil the taſte of young people, who, by an attention to them, are apt to prefer the marvellous, to the natural and ſimple truth. A droll *ſtory*, told with humour, is a great enlivener of company.

172.

no

Continuance,
Continuation,

Continuance, relates to duration; *continuation*, to extent.

We ſhould ſtudy a conſcientious diſcharge of our duty, during our *continuance* in any office. The ſeveral books, contained in the volume of Paradiſe Loſt, are *continuations*, of the ſame ſubject.

173.

Continual,
Continued.

There may be an interruption in that, which is *continual*; but that, which is *continued*, will not admit of it. So that the firſt of theſe words, denotes properly, the length of duration, although, there may be intervals, and, different renewals; and, the ſecond, marks ſimply, the unity of that duration, independent either of length, or, ſhortneſs

ſhortneſs of the time; it is, for this reaſon, we ſay, a *continual* noiſe; *continual* rains; but, a *continued* ſtream; and, in muſic, a *continued* baſe.

Continual interruptions will make us weary of the beſt undertakings. In countries, ſituated near the poles, there is, for the ſpace of five or ſix months together, one *continued* darkneſs, inſomuch, that the inhabitants, during that time, are obliged to leave the place.

174.

To *Bid*, *Order*.

The firſt, of theſe, is extremely general, the other more limited. To *bid*, intimates, direction to perform, whether the perſon directing, has any authority for ſo doing, or, not. To *order*, implies, the exerciſe of authority.

Some people are ſo very officious, that they are, always, ready to do, what they are *bid*, whether the thing be right or wrong, or,

or, the perſon *bidding*, be impowered, to *order* them, or, not.

175.

Yet,	*However*,
In the mean while,	*Nevertheleſs*.

Yet, ſeems, to have more force and energy; it aſſures, with firmneſs, in ſpite of every oppoſition. *In the mean while*, is leſs abſolute, it affirms, only, againſt contrary appearances. *However*, diſtinguiſhes two things, which ſeem oppoſite; ſupporting one without hurting the other. *Nevertheleſs*, affirms a thing, by exception; giving us to underſtand, that it does not occur, but, at the time, we are ſpeaking.

Though the whole earth is in arms againſt truth, *yet*, it does not prevent its triumphing. Some parents are very ſtrict, with reſpect to the morals of their children; *in the mean while*, will indulge themſelves, in every thing, their own heart can wiſh. Addiſon was a wretched ſpeaker, *however*, he was an excellent author.

Churchill,

Churchill, every one knows, was a bad liver; *nevertheleſs*, he was of ſome ſervice to his country, by ridiculing vice, and laſhing venality.

176.

Excellency,
Excellence.

Notwithſtanding theſe words are, evidently, the ſame, *excellence*, being no other than *excellencie*, contracted, or, the redundant ſyllable, general in old writing, taken away; yet, cuſtom ſeems to have applied *excellency*, to expreſs the title of a govenour, or, that of an ambaſſador, from one prince, to another, whereas, by *excellence*, is underſtood, the ſtate of abounding in any good quality.

177.

Pride, *Arrogance,* *Vanity,*	*Preſumption,* *Haughtineſs.*

Pride, is, unreaſonable or inordinate ſelf-eſteem. *Arrogance*, implies, taking much upon ourſelves, and, is *pride* attended with inſolence and contempt. *Vanity*, is accompanied with affectation, and, means, *pride*, exerted, on ſlight grounds. By *preſumption*, is underſtood, a blind, and, adventurous confidence; with reſpect to *haughtineſs*, it is a mixture of ſoftneſs and inſolence, the immediate effect of *pride*.

The *haughtineſs* of the *proud* man, is inſufferable. *Pride* makes us value ourſelves; *arrogance*, deſpiſe others; Through *vanity*, we covet the attention of our acquaintance. *Preſumption* flatters us, with having a vain power.

The *proud*, conſider themſelves, in their own mind; full, and, ſelf-ſwoln, they are taken up, with their own perſon. The *arrogant*, claim to themſelves, what they have not the leaſt pretentions to, are ready

to

to inſult thoſe, who will not allow them, what they claim; and look down, on the reſt of the world, with contempt. The *vain*, value themſelves, upon the opinion of others; greedy of eſteem, they are eager, to engroſs the attention of all mankind. The *preſumptious*, carry their audacious hopes, even to chimeras; bold, to undertake, they, fondly, imagine they have power to do every thing.

The greateſt pain, we can, poſſibly, give the *proud* man, is, by laying his defects, before his eyes. We cannot hurt the *arrogant*, ſo much, as by ſilent contempt. We cannot mortify a *vain* man more, than by paying no attention, to thoſe qualifications or qualities, he prides himſelf in. In order to confound the *preſumptuous*, we need, only, deſire him, to put his *vain* deſigns in execution.

178.

Cure,
Remedy.

We perform a *cure*. We procure a *remedy*. The firſt, relates more to the malady, and, to the action of him, who heals it; the ſecond, has more relation to health, and, the ſtate of the malady, we heal. We ſay, of a *cure*, that, it is fine; when its ſucceſs, does honour to the perſon, who formed it; and, we ſay, of a *remedy*, that, it is certain, or, ſure; when its operations are efficacious; that is, when it produces thoſe conſequences, we intended; and, we ſay of both, that, they are, either, eaſy, or, difficult.

Cure, ſeems to have no other object, than ſtubborn diſorders, and thoſe, which proceed from conſtitution; whereas, *remedy*, has a view to ſlight complaints, and, ſuch, as are of ſhort duration.

The more inveterate the diſorder, the more difficult the *cure*; in many caſes, regular living, is the beſt *remedy*.

The

The word *cure*, is, often, conſidered, as the effect of *remedy*. Some *remedies*, will complete a *cure*, much ſooner than others.

Incurable diſorders, are not, only, thoſe, where the *cure* is abſolutely impoſſible; bu, ſuch, as, for which, no *remedy* can be found.

179.

Haughtineſs,
Diſdain.

Both theſe words, denote, a diſpoſition, that prevents affability, and keeps us at a diſtance from thoſe, whom we think beneath us, either in birth, fortune, or, abilities, with this difference, that, *haughtineſs* is founded upon the eſteem, a man has for himſelf; and, *diſdain*, upon the diſeſteem, he has for others.

Haughtineſs, is ſeldom met with, but in perſons of weak underſtanding, and thoſe, who have had a bad education. There are, a ſort of vain people, who look upon *diſdain*, as a perſonal accompliſhment; and, who uſe it on all occaſions, as, a teſt of the merit, they pretend to.

180.

Sloth,
Lazineſs,
Sluggiſhneſs.

Sloth and *lazineſs*, are voluntary, with this difference, that *ſloth*, implies, utter inactivity, an abſolute averſion to work; *lazineſs*, an inclination, but, a fear of trouble and fatigue: whereas, *ſluggiſhneſs*, is, often, involuntary; proceeding, ſometimes, from conſtitution, and, is diſcovered, by its dull, heavy method of acting.

The *ſlothful* man, will not work, at all. The *lazy* man, is drawn to it, with difficulty. The *ſluggiſh* man is ſlow, through the whole operation.

Induſtry, is the reverſe of *ſloth*; activity, of *lazineſs*; expedition, of *ſluggiſhneſs*.

He, who is *ſlothful*, is a murderer of time. *Lazineſs*, is its own puniſhment. A *ſluggiſh* perſon, is fit for no kind of employment, ſeldom doing any thing well, he undertakes.

181.

181.

Harm,	*Detriment*,
Hurt,	*Miſchief*.
Injury,	

Theſe words, imply, ſome kind of ill, happening to a man's perſon, character, or, property. Thoſe of *harm*, and, *hurt*, relate more to the perſon, or, character; with this difference, that *harm*, ſeems to denote, a ſmall degree of *hurt*; *hurt*, a great degree of *harm*. *Miſchief*, implies, ill, to the perſon, or, property, and appears, ever, to be done, with an evil intent. *Injury*, intimates, a degree of *hurt*, without juſtice; and relates to the character, or, property. *Detriment*, carries an idea of loſs, and, is ſeldom uſed, but, with, regard to property.

By wounding a man, more or leſs, we *harm*, or, *hurt*, his perſon. By ſpeaking ill of him, deſervedly or not, we *harm*, or, *hurt*, his character: by breaking his head, or, ſetting fire to his houſe, we are ſaid to do him a *miſchief*. By taking away his good name, we *injure* his character: by defrauding him of his goods, we *injure* him

in

in his property. By breaking a hedge, or, treading down of corn, we do a great deal of *detriment*.

182.

Quickly,
Soon,
Speedily.

The word *quickly*, ſeems, more proper, to expreſs the motion, with which, we act; its reverſe, is, ſlowly. The word, *ſoon*, reſpects the time, when the action is performed; its reverſe, is, late. The word, *ſpeedily*, has a greater relation to the time, we employ about a thing; its reverſe, is, long-time.

We advance the more by going *quick*; but, we go ſurely, by going ſlowly. Wickedneſs is always, puniſhed, either, *ſooner*, or later. It is neceſſary, to be a long-time deliberating; but, we ſhould execute *ſpeedily*.

He, who begins *ſoon*, and, works *quick*; will *ſpeedily*, have done.

183.

183.

Aſſiduous,
Expeditious,
Quick.

When we are *aſſiduous*, at work, we loſe no time; when *expeditious*, we defer not, but finiſh immediately: when *quick*, we work with activity. Idleneſs, delay, and ſlowneſs, are the three defects, oppoſite to theſe three good qualities.

An *aſſiduous* man, thinks nothing of the trouble of what he takes in hand. An *expeditious* man, will not quit his work. One that is *quick*, will preſently, have done.

We ſhould be *aſſiduous*, in what we undertake; *expeditious*, in affairs, that require to be ſoon ended; and *quick*, in the execution of orders.

184.

Now,	*Immediately*,
Inſtantly,	*Preſently*.

The doing a thing *now*, expreſſes the taking it in hand, at that very inſtant; the other three words, as they are here placed, expreſs a time farther and farther off. *Inſtantly*, implies, without any perceptible intervention of time. *Immediately*, means, without delay. By *preſently*, is underſtood, ſoon after.

185.

Faſhion,
Cuſtom.

Theſe two words, like many others, I have taken notice of, tho' they may not ſtrike the reader, at firſt ſight, as words, reputed ſynonymous; have, nevertheleſs, been uſed as ſuch, by ſome of our beſt writers, and, are, at preſent: it is therefore neceſſary, to point out the difference between them. *Faſhion*, then, ſeems, more

more univerſal; *cuſtom*, more antient: that, which the greater part of the people practice, is, a *faſhion*; that, which has been practiſed a long time, is, a *cuſtom*.

Faſhion, introduces itſelf, and, extends daily; *cuſtom*, eſtabliſhes itſelf, and, gains authority; the firſt, forms the mode; the ſecond, a uſage: each, is a kind of law, independent on reaſon, with reſpect to that, which relates to our outward actions.

There is, ſometimes, more policy in conforming to a bad *faſhion*; than being ſingular in ſome good things. Many perſons follow *cuſtom*, even in their way of thinking; imbibing the notions of their mothers and nurſes.

186.

Variation,
Change.

Variation, conſiſts in being, as much of one ſort, as another: *Change*, conſiſts, only, in ceaſing to be the ſame.

We *vary* in our ſentiments, when, we give them up, and, embrace them again. We *change* our opinions, when, we reject one, in order, to embrace another.

He, who has no certain principles, is liable to *vary*. He, who is more attached to fortune, than truth, will find no difficulty in *changing* his doctrine.

187.

Variation,
Variety.

Succeſſive changes, in the ſame ſubject, make *variation*: A multitude of different objects, forms *variety*. Thus, we ſay, the the *variation* of time; *variety* of colours.

There is no government, but, is ſubject to *variation*. There is no ſpecies in nature, in which, we may not obſerve great *variety*.

188.

Track,
Footſtep.

Track, is more general; meaning, any mark left on the way, of whatever paſſed.

Footſtep,

Footſtep, is more limited; implying, the print of the feet. Thus, we ſay, the *track* of a horſe, or, a carriage; but, the *footſteps*, of a man.

189.

Fickle, | *Unſteady*,
Inconſtancy, | *Changeable*.

The attachments, of the *fickle* man, are ſlight; thoſe, of the *inconſtant*, of ſhort duration. As to the words, *unſteady*, and, *changeable*, they imply, an averſion in adhering to the ſame thing; with this difference, that the *unſteady* man, is, eager to enjoy many things; the *changeable* man, is, in conſtant ſearch of different ones.

Men, are, commonly, more *fickle* and *inconſtant*, than women; but women, more *unſteady* and *changeable*, than men. The firſt, err thro' indifference; the ſecond, thro' a love of novelty. Conſequently, it is a merit, in men, to perſevere; and in women, to reſiſt.

190.

Rogue,
Sharper,
Thief.

Theſe are all perſons, who ſteal what does not belong to them; with this difference, that the *rogue*, ſteals in ſecret; he pilfers. The *ſharper*, ſteals, by fineſſe; he over-reaches. The *thief*, ſteals, by all manner of means, robbing by force and violence.

The *rogue*, fears to be diſcovered; the *ſharper*, to be known again; and the *thief*, to be taken.

191.

Intention,
Deſign.

Intention, is, a diſpoſition or inclination of the mind, to ſomething at a diſtance; its characteriſtic, is to aim. *Deſign*, ſeems to ſuppoſe, ſomething ſtudied and methodical;

cal; it is employed, in ſearching out the means of execution.

Intentions, are more ſecret and vague; *deſigns*, more extenſive, and, more rational.

Intention, is the ſoul of action, and, the ſpring of true worth. *Deſign*, is, the effect of reflection.

As, no one cares to be balked in his *intentions*, or, croſſed in his *deſigns*; we ſhould have no other *intention*, than, to do our duty; nor, any other *deſign*, than, to conform to the will of Providence.

Nothing is leſs followed, than, the original *intention* of charitable foundations. Nothing has been found more difficult to accompliſh, than, the *deſign* of bringing about a thorough reformation of manners.

That man is, truly, great, who is right in his *intentions*, and, reaſonable, in his *deſigns*.

192.

Unpolite,
Clowniſh.

It is a much greater defect, to be *clowniſh*, than, to be, barely, *unpolite*.

Unpoliteneſs, is, a want of good-manners: it does not pleaſe. *Clowniſhneſs*, is, a mixture of ill-manners: it diſpleaſes.

Clowniſhneſs, proceeds, from an entire want of education: *unpoliteneſs*, is owing to a bad one.

193.

To *Tolerate*,
Suffer,
Permit.

We *tolerate* a thing, when, knowing it, and, having ſufficient power, we do not hinder it. We *ſuffer* it, by making no oppoſition, but, ſeeming, either, not to know it, or, not to have the power of preventing

venting it. We *permit* it, when we authoriſe it, by formal conſent.

The words, *tolerate* and *ſuffer*, are never uſed, but, with reſpect to bad things, or, ſuch, as we believe ſo; whereas, the word *permit*, relates, either, to good or bad.

The legiſlative power is, ſometimes, obliged to *tolerate* certain evils, in order, to prevent worſe. It is, ſometimes, prudence, to *ſuffer*, even, abuſe in the diſcipline of the church, rather, than deſtroy its unity. Human laws never will *permit*, what the divine law forbids; but, ſometimes, forbids, what the other will *permit*.

194.

Gay,
Merry,
Diverting.

We are *gay*, by diſpoſition; *merry*, through turn of mind; *diverting*, by our way of acting. Sad, ſerious, and, tireſome, are, exactly, their oppoſites.

Our *gaiety* turns almoſt, entirely, to our own advantage: our *merriment*, at the ſame time, that it is agreeable to others, it is no leſs ſo, to ourſelves; but, our being *diverting*, is enjoyed, only, by the company.

A *gay* man, will laugh himſelf; a *merry* man, is good company; a *diverting* man, will make us laugh.

We ſhould, if poſſible, ſuppreſs our *gaiety*, when, in the houſe of affliction. We ſhould ceaſe to be *merry*, when, others are ſad. We ſhould take care not to be *diverting*, at the expence of our character, or, good-ſenſe.

195.

Enmity,
Rancour.

Enmity, is more declared; it ſeems, always, open. *Rancour*, is more concealed; it, generally, diſſembles.

Bad ſervices, and, rude language, create *enmity*; which never ceaſes, 'till tired out with

with puniſhing; or, a reconciliation is brought about, by the interceſſion of friends. Remembrance of injuries, or, affronts received, keeps *rancour* alive in the breaſt; which never ſubſides, while there is the leaſt thirſt of vengeance; or, 'till we pardon, ſincerely.

Enmity, does not, always, deſtroy our eſteem for an enemy, nor, prevent our doing him the juſtice, he is entitled to; but, it will not admit of our careſſing him, or, doing him any good, otherwiſe, than through a ſenſe of honour, or, greatneſs of ſoul; to which, we, ſometimes, ſacrifice our vengeance. *Rancour*, makes us embrace, with pleaſure, every opportunity of revenging ourſelves; but, can hide itſelf, with the cloak of friendſhip, 'till the very moment it begins to act.

Enmity is, ſometimes, noble, and it would be mean not to conceive it, againſt certain perſons; but, *rancour* is, always, low.

A ſettled *enmity* in families, ſometimes, runs through many generations; and will not ceaſe, 'till time ſhall obliterate it. Perfect reconciliations are very rare; there re-

 maining,

maining, often, a great deal of *rancour*, in the breaſts of thoſe, who ſeem moſt ſincere.

A philoſopher ſhould have no object of *enmity*, but, the diſturbers of public tranquillity. If *rancour* can, in any caſe, be excuſable, it muſt be, with reſpect to traitors; their crime, being too black, to be thought of, without indignation.

196.

To *Inſinuate*, *Suggeſt*.

We *inſinuate*, by cunning, and, addreſs; we *ſuggeſt*, by credit, and, artifice.

In order, to *inſinuate*, we muſt conſult both time and opportunity; in order, to *ſuggeſt*, it is neceſſary, to have aſcendancy over the minds of perſons.

Inſinuate, implies, ſomething delicate: *ſuggeſt*, frequently, ſomething fraudulent.

We cover, artfully, what we would *inſinuate*: and, what we would *ſuggeſt*, we make of ſome conſequence.

We, often, imagine that, what, others *inſinuate*, was firſt thought of, by ourſelves. He, who *ſuggeſts* evil to another, is much more culpable, than he, who commits it.

197.

Ordinary,
Common.

Theſe words, have been reputed ſynonymous, in two ſenſes; as implying, frequent uſe; and, meaning, of little or no value: but, they are different in both. In the firſt ſenſe, the word, *ordinary*, ſeems to me, to be beſt applied, when the repetition of actions, is in queſtion; *common*, when a multitude of objects. Thus, nothing is more *ordinary* at court, than diſſimulation. Monſters are *common* in Africa.

In the ſecond, that, which is *ordinary*, has nothing, to diſtinguiſh it; that, which is *common*, has nothing, to make it ſought after.

198.

198.

To *Hear*,
Hearken.

To *hear*, implies, having the ear ſtruck with any ſound. To *hearken*, means, to lend an ear, in order, to *hear*. Sometimes, we *hear*, without *hearkening*; and, we, often, *hearken*, without *hearing*.

199.

To *Underſtand*,
Comprehend,
Conceive.

To have juſt and proper ideas of every thing, that occurs, is the common ſignification of theſe words: but, to *underſtand*, implies, a conformity of ideas, which has a peculiar relation to the value of the terms, we uſe; to *comprehend*, denotes, ſuch a conformity, as anſwers directly, to the nature of the things, we explain; and that, which is expreſſed by the word,

conceive,

conceive, relates, more eſpecially, to the order and deſign, of what, we propoſe. The firſt, is uſed, with propriety, when, applied to the particulars, of what, we ſay; the tone, with which, we ſpeak; the turn of our phraſes; and, the delicacy of our expreſſions. The ſecond, ſeems to agree beſt, with a relation to principles, leſſons, precepts, and, ſpeculative knowledge. The third, appears with greater elegance, when, it relates to forms, arrangement, projects, and, plans; in ſhort, all that depends on the imagination.

We *underſtand* languages. We *comprehend* ſciences. We *conceive*, whatever has relation to arts.

It is difficult to *underſtand* that, which is enigmatical; to *comprehend* that, which is abſtruſe; and, to *conceive* that, which is confuſed.

Readineſs of *underſtanding*, is a mark of acuteneſs; that, of *comprehenſion*, is, a proof of penetration; that, of *conception*, denotes, a clear head.

A lover, *underſtands* the language of the paſſions. A learned man, *comprehends* the metaphyſical queſtions of the ſchools. An architect,

architect, *conceives* the plan and œconomy of buildings.

200.

Faſhion,
Figure,
Form.

Faſhion, riſes from labour, and, reſults from the workmanſhip; the workman, enriching it, more or leſs, according to his taſte. *Figure*, ſprings from deſign, and, reſults from the out-lines of the thing; the author of the plan, making it, either more or leſs, regular, according to his abilities. *Form*, riſes from conſtruction, and, reſults, from the arrangement of parts; the conductor of the work, making it, more or leſs, natural, as his imagination directs him.

The *faſhion* of a work, frequently, exceeds in value, the price of the materials. We ſeldom give in architecture a round *figure* to any thing, except, to ſingle pieces, and, ſuch as ſtand by themſelves. Paganiſm pictures the Deity, under all kinds of

of *forms*; whereas, Chriſtianity confines it to thoſe, of a man, and, of a dove.

We ſay of *faſhion*, that it is, either pretty, or, ugly; of *figure*, that it is, either, agreeable, or, diſagreeable; of *form*, that, it is, either, common, or, uncommon.

201.

Fault,
Defect,
Imperfection.

Fault, includes in its idea, a relation to the maker; ſo that, while it implies, ſome real want, in the finiſhing of the work, it denotes, alſo, that, it was owing to the workman. *Defect*, expreſſes ſomething *imperfect*, in the thing, without any relation to the maker of it. *Imperfection*, intimates, ſomething of leſs conſequence, than is underſtood by the preceding words, and, is uſed, with more propriety, in morality, than, either, in phyſics, or, mechanics.

The ſmoaking of chimneys, is a great *fault* in houſes; as, a little attention in the builder, may eaſily prevent it. When the beauty of a building is ſpoiled, for want of room,

We make *experiments*, in order, to know; *trials*, to chooſe; and, *proofs*, to be, thoroughly, acquainted with.

Experiments, confirm our opinions; being the root of knowledge. *Trial*, conducts our taſte; being the road to ſatisfaction. *Proof*, removes our fears; and, is a remedy againſt error and impoſture.

End of the FIRST VOLUME.

and, the ſecond, upon the firſt; each of them, implying, an oppoſition to liberty. The word, *oblige*, relates more to duty, or, neceſſity; intimating, a power acting on us, in conformity to our inclinations: *conſtrain*, refers to thoſe troubleſome oppoſitions, that make us determine, againſt our inclinations; *compel*, alludes to power and authority, which makes us act, in expreſs contrariety to our will, which, we lament the not being maſter of: the word, *force*, implies, contrary efforts of a vigorous action, which, we try to reſiſt, but, in vain.

The duty of a child, to its parents, *obliges* it, to aſſiſt him, in his old-age. The weaker and ſofter ſex, is that, which can leaſt brook *conſtraint*. There are, ſome, occaſions, on which we ſhould not be ſorry, to be *compelled*, even to that, we are moſt unwilling to do. Ancient politeneſs of the table, went ſo far, as, to *force* gueſts to eat and drink.

204.

Heavineſs,
Weight.

In the figurative ſenſe, the difference of theſe words, is ſo extremely great, as to need no pointing out; in the literal, indeed, they are, often, confounded; conſidered then, in this laſt ſenſe, *heavineſs*, is that quality in a body, which we feel, and, diſtinguiſh by itſelf: *weight*, is the meaſure and degree of that quality, which we cannot aſcertain, but, by compariſon.

We ſay, abſolutely, and, in an undetermined ſenſe, that a thing is *heavy*; but relatively, and, in a manner determined, that, it is of ſuch a *weight*, for example, of two, three, or, four pounds.

A thouſand circumſtances, prove the *heavineſs* of the air; and, the mercury, determines its exact *weight*.

a child, to its parents; the ribbon of an order, the ſtaff of command, ſeals, and, dignities to a prince; we *reſtore*, an accuſed perſon, when found innocent, to his eſtates and honours; and, a minor, to the poſſeſſion of his effects, which have been held from him.

206.

Sincerity,	*Plainneſs*,
Frankneſs,	*Ingenuouſneſs*.

Sincerity, prevents our ſpeaking, otherwiſe, than we think; and, is a virtue. *Frankneſs*, makes us ſpeak, as we think; and, is a natural effect. *Plainneſs*, is, ſpeaking, freely, what we think; and, ſprings, ſometimes, from want of reflection. *Ingenuouſneſs*, makes us declare what we know; and, is, often, a folly.

A *ſincere* man, will not deceive; a *frank* man, will not diſſemble; a *plain* man, is not apt to flatter; an *ingenuous* man, knows not how to conceal any thing.

Sincerity, is of great value, in the intercourſe of the heart. *Frankneſs*, facilitates the

the commerce of the world. *Plainneſs*, is, often, conſidered, as a want of politeneſs. *Ingenuouſneſs*, is, frequently, found to err, againſt prudence.

The *ſincere*, are, always, eſteemed. The *frank*, pleaſe all the world. The *plain*, ſometimes, offend. The *ingenuous*, often, betray themſelves.

207.

Experiment,
Trial,
Proof.

Experiment, relates, properly, to the truth of things; it determines, whether a thing is, or, is not; clearing up of doubt, and, diſſipating ignorance. *Trial*, concerns, particularly, the uſe of things; judging, whether they are proper, or, not; it ſettles the matter, and, determines the will. *Proof*, has a greater relation to the quality of things; teaching us, whether they are good, or, bad, diſtinguiſhing the beſt, and, taking away any fear of being deceived.

We

We make *experiments*, in order, to know; *trials*, to chooſe; and, *proofs*, to be, thoroughly, acquainted with.

Experiments, confirm our opinions; being the root of knowledge. *Trial*, conducts our taſte; being the road to ſatisfaction. *Proof*, removes our fears; and, is a remedy againſt error and impoſture.

End of the First Volume.

THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT

This book is under no circumstances to be taken from the Building

Form 410